























Analytical and numerical 









* Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław 
University of Technology, Poland 
** KGHM Polska Miedź, Poland 
Hugo Steinhaus Center 
Wrocław University of Technology 
Wyb. Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland  
http://www.im.pwr.wroc.pl/~hugo/ Instytut Matematyki i Informatyki
Politechnika Wroc  lawska
KGHM Polska Mied´ z
Analityczne i numeryczne podej´ scie do modelowania
ryzyka operacyjnego ﬁrmy
Pawe  l Mi´ sta
Rozprawa doktorska
Promotor: prof. dr hab. Aleksander Weron
Wroc  law, Sierpie´ n 2006Institute of Mathematics and Informatics
Wroc  law University of Technology
KGHM Polska Mied´ z
Analytical and numerical approach to corporate
operational risk modelling
Pawe  l Mi´ sta
Ph.D. Thesis
Supervisor: prof. dr hab. Aleksander Weron
Wroc  law, August 20061Contents
Introduction. 4
Chapter 1. Banking operational risk established, corporate risk measurement as a new
challenge. 6
1.1. The New Accord (Basel II) 6
1.2. Risk measurement methods for operational risk 7
1.3. Loss Distribution Approach 8
1.4. Motivation to model operational risk with ruin theory 10
Chapter 2. Market risk management in corporation. Hedging as a key tool. 12
2.1. Setting up the problem 12
2.2. Modelling risk factors 14
2.3. How to calculate the RaR measure 16
Chapter 3. Some basic aspects of actuarial risk theory. 21
3.1. Collective risk model and ruin probabilities 21
3.2. Adjustment coeﬃcient 22
Chapter 4. Ruin probability in ﬁnite time horizon. 24
4.1. Exact ruin probabilities in ﬁnite time 25
4.2. Approximations of the ruin probability in ﬁnite time 26
4.3. Numerical comparison of the ﬁnite time approximations 28
Chapter 5. Inﬁnite horizon. 32
5.1. Exact ruin probabilities 32
5.2. A survey of approximations 34
5.3. Summary of the approximations 40
5.4. Numerical comparison of the methods 40
5.5. Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation as the reference method 42
Chapter 6. Diﬀusion model with losses given by mixture of exponentials. 45
6.1. Laplace transform of claims being rational function 46
6.2. Mixture of exponentials claims 51
Chapter 7. Building operational reserves. 53
23
7.1. Introduction 53
7.2. Ruin probability criterion 54
7.3. Ruin probability criterion and the insurance 59
7.4. Final remarks 62
Bibliography 63Introduction.
For the last several years, the nature of operational risk has become a ﬁeld of intensive studies
due to its growing importance as against market and credit risk. Appropriate deﬁning and quantifying
operational risk is a hard task, thus suitable regulatory is still in development. Although The New Basel
Accord gives the methodology for managing banking operational risk, the corporate risk seems not to
be recognized enough. Here in the thesis we make an attempt to put some insight into operational risk
measurement in the non-ﬁnancial corporation. The objective is to apply suitable results from insurance
ruin theory to build a framework for measuring corporate operational risk and ﬁnding required capital
charge.
In the second Chapter, a brief description of banking operational risk regulatory and methodological
proposals for risk measurement is presented. The detailed discussion on the topic can be found in
consultative documents by Basel Committee (i.e. [2], [3], [4]) and review papers by Pezier ([36], [37]).
Reﬁned analysis with exploiting Extreme Value Theory techniques are presented in papers by Embrechts
with others 2004–2006 ([17], [18], [11], [32]). We focus on the diﬀerences between a bank and commodity-
branch corporation in the ﬁeld of operational risk management. We introduce also a motivation to apply
ruin theory methods to operational risk measurement.
The next Chapter is devoted to some aspects of commodity market risk measurement with em-
phasizing such diﬀerences from banking methodology as time horizon for decisions, managers activity
and diﬀerent risk measures. The correlation-based, analytical approach to Revenues at Risk (RaR) and
Earnings at Risk (EaR) measures calculation is proposed instead of Monte Carlo simulation methods.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 consist of wide studies of ruin probability estimates with the distinction for
ﬁnite and inﬁnite time horizon methods. Basic aspects of insurance risk theory are presented and several
ruin probability approximations are described. They are numerically compared with each other and
illustrated as a functions of capital and (in the ﬁnite horizon case) time horizon. Moreover, we propose
two promising, new approximations. Chapters 3–5 are based on earlier papers by Burnecki, Mi´ sta, Weron
([9], [7]) and Chapter 15 in [12].
Next, in the Chapter 6 we consider more complicated model of risk process, allowing for diﬀusion
component. Numerically tractable formula for ruin probability is found in the case of losses distribution
with Laplace transform being rational function. Moreover, an analytic result is given when the claim size
is described by mixture of exponentials distribution, being of high importance when modelling operational
risk (cf. Chapter 1). The general ideas and parts of the Chapter are heavily borrowed from papers by
Jacobsen ([25], [26], [27]).
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Finally, in the last Chapter, based on Otto & Mi´ sta [30], we deal with setting appropriate level of
capital charge for operational risk with possible risk transfer through insurance. By inverting various
approximations of ruin probability we arrive at suitable capital charge with predetermined level of such
probability. In the case of operational risk modelling in non-ﬁnancial corporation , this approach seems
to be a proper alternative to high conﬁdence level Value at Risk (V aR) measure.CHAPTER 1
Banking operational risk established, corporate risk
measurement as a new challenge.
1.1. The New Accord (Basel II)
The short brief of the history of risk management regulatory takes us back to the 1988, when the
Basel Accord (Basel I) was established. The document was concerning the minimal capital requirements
against credit risk with one standardized approach, namely Cooke ratio. Next, in 1996, in amendment
to Basel I, the necessary regulatory for managing market risk appeared, i.e. internal models, netting
and ﬁnally Value at Risk measure. Consequently, for the next years we came to the term operational
risk. In 1999 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the ﬁrst consultative paper on the New
Accord (Basel II), introducing deﬁnition of operational risk and submitting some proposals of measuring
methods and suitable regulatory. Until now several consultative papers on the New Basel Capital Accord
appeared but the full implementation of Basel II is not expected before 2007.
First of all, the New Accord brings more ﬂexibility and risk sensitivity in the structure of three-pillar
framework: minimal capital requirements (Pillar 1), supervisory review of capital adequacy (Pillar 2) and
public disclosure (Pillar 3). Pillar 1 sets out the minimum capital requirements (Cook Ratio, McDonough
Ratio) to 8%:
(1.1)
total amount of capital
risk-weighted assets
≥ 8%,
resulting in the deﬁnition of minimum regulatory capital (MRC):
(1.2) MRC
def = 8% of risk-weighted assets.
Due to New Accord, the most accurately describing deﬁnition of operational risk can be formulated
in the following way.
Definition 1.1.1. Operational risk is the risk of (direct or indirect) losses resulting from inadequate
or failed internal processes and procedures, people and systems, or external events.
It should be remarked that this deﬁnition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational
risk.
Let us denote by Cop the capital charge for operational risk. It was initially feared that the Basel II
proposals would reduce the capital requirements for credit and market risks by 20% on average. However,
still growing risks such as fraud, terrorism, technology failures and trade settlements errors, may leave
the banking industry more exposed to operational risk than ever before. This led the Basel Committee to
propose a new tranche of capital charges for operational risk equal to 20% of purely credit and market risk
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minimum capital requirements. After further studies on how much of the economic capital the banking
industry allocates to operational risk, and in response to other industry concerns, the Basel Committee
proposed to reduce the operational risk minimum regulatory capital ﬁgure from 20% down to 12% of
MRC. Finally we should notice that it is not uncommon to ﬁnd that Cop > Cmr (Cmr being market risk
capital charge).
1.2. Risk measurement methods for operational risk
In the New Accord documents, the Committee proposes three diﬀerent approaches to operational
risk measurement:
• Basic Indicator Approach (BIA),
• Standardized Approach (SA),
• Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA).
The ﬁrst and the most crude, but simple approach relies just on taking capital charge on operational
risk (say Cbia
op ) as some percentage of average annual gross income:
(1.3) Cbia
op = αGI,
where Gross Income (GI) means average annual gross income over the previous three years and
α = 15% is an indicator set by the Committee based on Collective Investment Schemes (CIS).
The Standardized Approach, similar to BIA and also simple, takes into account indicators on the






with βi ∈ [12%,18%], 3-year averaging and 8 business lines speciﬁed by Committee:
Table 1.1. Business lines and corresponding indicator’s levels.
Corporate ﬁnance (18%)
Payment & Settlement (18%)






From our point of view, the most interesting and reﬁned is the latter approach, considering more
sophisticated methods of risk measurement - Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA). On the one hand,
there has been a lot of critique put on the naive, linear approaches (BIA and SA), but on the other, the
AMA approach is with no doubt more demanding (for detailed critique see i.e. Pezier [36],[37]). Involving1.3. LOSS DISTRIBUTION APPROACH 8
advanced methods we encounter the serious problem of estimating very rare events (having probability
less than 0.1%).
Generally, with the Advanced Measurement Approach, the Basel Committee allows banks to use
their internally generated risk estimates after meeting qualitative and quantitative standards. Also the
risk mitigation via insurance is possible ( 20% of Cop) and incorporation of risk diversiﬁcation beneﬁts
is allowed. Although AMA leads directly to Loss Distribution Approach (LDA), the Committee “is not
specifying the approach or distributional assumptions used to generate the operational risk measures for
regulatory capital purposes.” Except LDA, the Committee also considers the Scorecard Approaches and








with ESik being expected aggregated loss for business line i and risk type k, γik scaling factors and the
speciﬁed 7 loss types:
Table 1.2. Classiﬁed 7 risk/loss types.
Internal fraud
External fraud
Employment practices and workplace safety
Clients, products & business practices
Damage to physical assets
Business disruption and system failures
Execution, delivery & process management
We omit the detailed discussion on all approaches presented above as it is not a part of further analysis
here, but we focus on the Loss Distribution Approach as the most reﬁned and challenging method. We
refer interested Reader to regulatory and consultative papers by Basel Committee ([2], [3], [4]), moreover
the constructive review of Basel proposals can be found in papers by Pezier ([36], [37]).
1.3. Loss Distribution Approach
The Loss Distribution Approach tends to identify the one year loss distribution in each business line
/ loss type cell (i,k) and then to ﬁnd the appropriate risk measure on the basis of total one year loss













t being some counting process (measuring frequency of losses) in time t for cell (i,k) and X
i,k
l
corresponding variables describing severity of losses in cell (i,k). We should notice here for the ﬁrst time
the similarity to the actuarial theory and collective risk models in insurance. The severity variables X can1.3. LOSS DISTRIBUTION APPROACH 9
also be modelled with the most popular (nonnegative) distributions in insurance (exponential, gamma,
lognormal, Pareto) and Nt can be counting process like Poisson, binomial, negative binomial or one of
more complex point processes (see i.e. Burnecki & Weron Chapter 14 in [12]).




















Now what has to be done is to choose and calibrate the distribution of S
i,k
t for each cell, ﬁnding
possible correlations between cells and specifying risk measure gα at conﬁdence level α close to 1. The
total operational loss capital charge should be found on the basis of gα(S
i,k
t ) calculated for each cell.
Going further into details of Basel II proposals, we ﬁnd the risk measure to be popular Value at Risk
at a very high conﬁdence level α = 99.9% or even higher (99.95% − 99.97%). The distribution chosen
should be based on internal data and models, external data and expert opinions and period taken into
consideration equal to one year. Finally, the total capital charge Cop should be found as a sum of V aRs





Loss Distribution Approach in such a form, although being reﬁned enough, still encounters very seri-
ous diﬃculties in implementation. For the ﬁrst, such high conﬁdence level causes distribution estimation
very diﬃcult if possible, due to obvious lack of data. In solving these problems, Extreme Value Theory
(EVT) enters and such methods as Peaks Over Threshold (POT). The POT method focuses on that
realizations of variables X, that exceed some threshold u: Y = max(X − u,0). Distribution of Y , called
conditional excess distribution, is formulated in the following way:
(1.9) Fu(y) = P(X − u ≤ y|X > u), 0 ≤ y ≤ xF − u,
where xF ≤ ∞ is the right endpoint of the original distribution F of variable X. To handle the diﬃculties
of estimation of Fu (due to lack of data in that region), the EVT comes with strong, limiting result given
in the theorem of Picands (1975), Belkam and de Haan (1974).
Theorem 1.3.1. For every ξ ∈ R distribution F belongs to Maximal Domain of Attraction of Gen-





|Fu(x) − Gξ,σ(x)| = 0,











, ξ 6= 0
1 − exp(−y/σ), ξ = 0,





for ξ < 0 and some positive σ, depending on the value of
threshold level u.1.4. MOTIVATION TO MODEL OPERATIONAL RISK WITH RUIN THEORY 10
The above result gives us the analytical form of conditional excess distribution and makes the mod-
elling and estimation of total loss distribution much easier and clearer in a variety of possible single-loss
distributions. The GEV family of distributions contains three standard classes, namely Fr´ echet, Gumbel
and Weibull, and thus it includes almost all popular insurance and ﬁnancial distributions like Pareto,
Loggamma, Exponential-like, Weibull-like, Beta, Gamma, Normal and Lognormal. The theorem 1.3.1
in more extended form likewise the proof of it can be found in Embrechts, Kl¨ uppelberg, Mikosch [16].
For more details on the EVT and GEV, GPD distributions with application to operational risk mea-
surement we refer Reader to papers by Embrechts, Kaufmann, Samorodnitsky (2004) ([17], [18]) and
Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, Neslehova (2006) ([17], [18]).
However, some properties of data like non-stationarity, dependence and inhomogeneity still remain
the serious problem and make the use of multivariate extreme value theory and copulas necessary. Finally,
choosing V aR as a risk measure may lead to wrong conclusions because of lack of subadditivity in the
presence of dependent variables, whereas other risk measures require ﬁnite mean. All observed diﬃculties
cause the need for more reﬁned analysis to be done and more complicated models to be applied. We refer
reader to [17] and [18] for more details on applying EVT and POT methodology, and lately the inﬁnite
mean models, in measuring banking operational risk.
1.4. Motivation to model operational risk with ruin theory
Returning to main objective of the thesis – the operational risk modelling in non-ﬁnancial corporation,
we have to emphasize, that Basel II proposals refer predominantly to operational risk in banking industry.
The whole classiﬁcation with business lines and risk types and alike suggestion to consider one-year risk,
relates to banking speciﬁcation and does not capture individual features of non-ﬁnancial corporations. In
corporation and especially in commodity-branch corporation, the horizon of planning and the horizon of
making decisions is much longer than one year. Due to natural, several year cycles in commodity markets
and often the expensive, long-term investments, also the risk management decisions should encompass at
least a few-year horizon. Thus the operational risk policy should be adapted to such a situation, likewise
the market risk management and hedging in corporations diﬀers from the banking V aR-based, short term
risk management.
As we said before, the Loss Distribution Approach to operational risk modelling seems to be dual to
actuarial models in insurance, widely exploiting the sums of random variables, what results in studying
compound distributions. The most popular in insurance is the classical risk model with the variety of
extensions and generalizations. The deﬁnition and many properties of it will be widely described in
following chapters, now let us just focus on the similarities to LDA. The classical insurance risk model
for the reserve of company is given by equation




where u is assumed to be an initial capital, c – premium paid to insurer in time unit and Xi – losses
that happen in random moments modelled by jumps of counting process Nt. In LDA we focus only on1.4. MOTIVATION TO MODEL OPERATIONAL RISK WITH RUIN THEORY 11
the total loss St, modelled by random sum of the same type and ﬁnding the appropriate quantile to apply
the V aR method. We have to remark here, that according to theorem of combining compound Poisson
risks (see Panjer & Willmot [34]), the sum of the form (1.7) can be reformulated again as a
P ˜ Nt
i=1 ˜ Xi with
other Poisson counting process ˜ Nt and the distribution of ˜ Xi being a mixture of original distributions.
The aim of LDA is to ﬁnd on the basis of the model, the capital charge Cop for the next year. Our
proposal is to exploit the insurance risk model in a longer time horizon (at least several years) and use the
probability of ruin as a risk measure instead of V aR. In such a representation, c would model every year
capital charge Cop (we will call it operational reserves in next chapters) and u would be arbitrary amount
of capital that should never be exceeded under threat of bankruptcy (ruin). It could be for instance
the economic capital reduced by Cop or yearly net proﬁt assumed in budget for next few years. Quite
well developed actuarial methods of ruin probability estimation and ﬁnding the suitable level of premium
results in promising proposals of ﬁnding the appropriate level of capital charge on operational risk in
non-ﬁnancial corporation. Furthermore, the variety of generalizations of insurance risk model allow to
make the modelling closer to real life. These could be for instance taking c(t) instead of ct, randomizing
ct or making Nt much more complex. There are also models allowing to add the diﬀusion component.
The proposed approach, although having the same basis as LDA with V aR, is substantially diﬀerent
in the way the modelling with random variable is diﬀerent from modelling with stochastic process. Instead
of ﬁnding a quantile of estimated variable, the problem extends to ﬁnding ﬁrst the probability of ruin
(ﬁrst passage of the stochastic process problem) and then to invert it in order to ﬁnd the required capital
charge.CHAPTER 2
Market risk management in corporation. Hedging as a key tool.
2.1. Setting up the problem
On the contrary to new regulations and freshly developing methodology in the ﬁeld of operational
risk measurement, the market risk seems to be quite well recognized. There is a variety of publications
considering market risk measurement, modelling risk factors and methods of reducing the danger of
market risk. For last several years, hedging and ﬁnancial engineering has become even a separate part of
science and papers on new interesting ﬁnancial instruments are still published at very high intensity. The
ﬁeld of market risk measurement is so wide that we do not intent here to make any brief or summary but
just to show some aspects, that could be interesting for risk manager in his practice. First, we would like
to emphasize again the diﬀerence between banking market risk measurement and non-ﬁnancial, corporate
methodology. In the previous chapter we noticed the diﬀerence in the time horizon to be considered, the
other issue is the market activity.
The exposure of bank to market risk relates always to a set of portfolios. So every asset in each
portfolio will be a risk factor for a bank. The portfolio theory comes then with methodologies of managing
such risks, and many types of ﬁnancial instruments and derivatives become necessary. The important
issue is that portfolio manager can always decide to increase or reduce his exposure to risk by taking any
(long or short) position on the market. Taking now the producer of metal, oil, gas or any commodity as
an example of non-ﬁnancial corporation, the situation looks diﬀerent. The ﬁrm is also exposed to high
risks resulting from changing prices of commodities and currencies, however it has to be viewed as already
having natural long position. The scope of risk manager in such a ﬁrm is to hedge some part of commodity
that is to be sold, to minimize the volatility of cash ﬂows and potential future earnings, likewise to possibly
ensure reasonable, minimal price of production sale covering company’s costs. That obliges the manager
to take only short positions on the market, otherwise his activity would be a speculation, not hedging.
The corporation being consumer not producer of commodities exposed to market risk has similar but
opposite situation. All of these diﬀerences from banking industry cause not only the activity of risk
managers to be speciﬁed in other way, but also the applied risk measures to be diﬀerent. When the most
popular risk measure exploited in banks is V aR (Value at Risk - value of portfolio exposed to loss), the
measures used in non-ﬁnancial corporations are RaR (Revenues at Risk), EaR (Earnings at Risk) and
CFaR (Cash Flow at Risk). When V aR in bank should be calculated once a day, week or month with
such a short time horizon, RaR, EaR and CFaR in corporation should be prepared for quarter, year,
three-year horizon or even longer.
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As it was stated before, we focus on non-ﬁnancial corporation acting in the ﬁeld of commodities
as an example. The ﬁrst thing to be done to work out the system of risk measurement, is to set the
main risk factors and establish the map of exposure to classify which ﬁeld of activity is exposed to risk
that corporation is willing to measure and manage. Then, the most adequate stochastic model should
be chosen to each risk factor with determining all possible correlations. Next, according to the most
popular methodology there is a need for building the stochastic system that calibrates the models and
applies Monte Carlo simulations of each risk factor, to ﬁnally compute all the risk measures on that
basis. This standard approach seems to be very accurate and correct from methodological point of view,
however in practice risk managers encounter computational problems. As simulations have to be done in
quite a long time horizon, in order to obtain reasonable eﬀects, it does require a great number of Monte
Carlo simulations of possibly several, dependent stochastic processes describing risk factors. Next, a lot
of calculations has to be done to obtain the revenues and earnings at each time point in the future and
at the desired level of probability α. Especially if the portfolio of hedging positions is complicated and
consists of several thousands of instruments.
Thus, making some necessary assumptions and simpliﬁcations, we would like to propose an analytical
approach to calculate RaR or EaR measures referring to simple example, that can be however extended
to more general situations. The approach exploits some aspects of portfolio theory with correlation-based
calculations of total risk exposure (see RiskMetrics methodology), that can be illustrated by following
simple formula for V aR of the sum of two dependent portfolios X1 and X2:
(2.1) V aR(X1 + X2) =
q
V aR(X1)2 + V aR(X2)2 + 2V aR(X1)V aR(X2)ρX1,X2.
Let us consider the producer of some commodity Xt, that is denominated and quoted in foreign
currency. Its plans of production are established for next several years. Assume only two main sources
of risk: the commodity price Xt and foreign currency rate of exchange Yt. In fact, other market risks can
be often neglected due to its little importance comparing to Xt and Yt. The corporation has hedged its
production and possesses portfolio of commodity ”sell forward” contracts on Xt and portfolio of currency
”sell forwards”. All contracts are monthly settled, as that is exactly the basis of production sell. In fact,
hedging portfolio can contain much more complicated derivative instruments (including options), if only
there is a possibility of obtaining linear form of portfolio payout around its desired level of quantile in
each settlement month in the future.
Once the models of risk factors are chosen and calibration is done properly, the problem of analytical
determining of RaR and EaR measures leads to ﬁnding the distribution (in fact the quantiles and mean)
of revenues from sale of commodity in time t, reduced by settlement results from hedging portfolios in
time t, all valued in domestic currency. To ﬁnd the distribution of earnings we need only to include costs,
that we assume do not depend on risk factors.
For convenience purpose, let USD be the foreign currency with PLN being domestic one. Then Xt
is USD price of commodity and XtYt is its PLN value. We propose the following steps in reaching the
ﬁnal target.2.2. MODELLING RISK FACTORS 14
RaR algorithm
For every t starting from 0 to the end of time horizon for our analysis:
(1) First, compute the desired statistics (mean and quantiles of level α) for revenues from sell of
commodity Xt valued in PLN.
(2) Second, compute the statistics for PLN value of settlement result from commodity hedging
portfolio.
(3) Then, obtain the summary statistics in PLN (revenues from Xt + hedging of Xt + premiums
paid and received for commodity options) as a sum of results from point (1) and (2), corrected
by including obvious negative (close to -1) correlation between revenues Xt valued in PLN and
hedging Xt valued in PLN.
(4) Next, compute the statistics for settlement resulting from currency hedging portfolio.
(5) Now calculate the main outcome – total statistics for revenues from Xt reduced by result of
currency and commodity hedging portfolios. It will be found by summing values obtained in
points (3) and (4) with necessary correction by correlation between (3) (revenues from Xt +
hedging of Xt) and (4) (hedging of Yt).
(6) Finally, as a supplement we can compute the statistics for the whole hedging portfolio as a sum
of values calculated in points (2) and (4), corrected by correlation between commodity portfolio
and currency portfolio.
Proceeding this way allows to skip the calculation of redundant correlations, searching only for
necessary ones. Moreover, beyond the ﬁnal result, we receive the future distribution of separate portfolios
and revenues, what can be very useful in examining the structure of risk exposure.
2.2. Modelling risk factors
2.2.1. Schwartz commodity model. According to the best practices in commodity market, we
decide to model the commodity price by geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Schwartz mean-reverting
commodity model):




+ log(k) − log(Xt)

Xtdt + σXtdWt,
with k being mean reversion level, η - speed of mean reversion, σ -volatility and Wt standard Wiener
process.
Thus the price of commodity has the feature of returning to some long-term mean level and the
variance stabilizing with time ﬂow. The model seems to be widely exploited in the commodity market,
moreover its expected value in time often indicates similarity to commodity forward curve.





µt,X = log(Xt0)exp(−η(t − t0)) + log(k)(1 − exp(−η(t − t0))), σ2
t,X =
σ2 exp(−η(t − t0))
2η
.2.2. MODELLING RISK FACTORS 15









Var(Xt) = exp(2µt,X + σ2
t,X)(exp(σ2






with Φ−1(α) denoting the inverse of standard normal distribution function.
2.2.2. Calibration of Schwartz model. To calibrate the Schwartz model, we need to transform
Geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process to Arithmetic one by working with logarithms of price Xt (say
˜ Xt = log(Xt)). Then the equation takes a form:
(2.4) d ˜ Xt = η

log(k) − ˜ Xt

dt + σdWt.
There are two basic methods for calibrating the Arithmetic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process parameters:
the method of moments and maximum likelihood method. The ﬁrst is quite crude, however it gives
reasonable outcomes. The second, more reﬁned, requires three-dimensional optimization of likelihood
function, possibly driving to serious numerical problems, but it seems to eﬀect with more reliable results.
Moreover, according to paper by Jos´ e Carlos Garcia Franco ([10]), we can reduce the dimension of
optimization needed. Given n + 1 observations x = (xt0,...,xtn) of logarithms of prices in time points
ti, the log-likelihood function corresponding to conditional density of xti (with constant terms omitted)



















(xti − log(k) − (xti−1 − log(k))e−η(ti−ti−1))2
1 − e−2η(ti−ti−1) .
In his paper, exploiting some elementary analytical manipulations of the ﬁrst order conditions of
MLE, author ﬁnds convenient relations between MLE estimators ( ˆ log(k), ˆ η and ˆ σ):
ˆ log(k)(ˆ η) =
n X
i=1
xti − xti−1e−ˆ η(ti−ti−1)




1 − e−ˆ η(ti−ti−1)
1 + e−ˆ η(ti−ti−1)
!−1
, (2.6)







(xti − ˆ log(k) − (xti−1 − ˆ log(k))e−ˆ η(ti−ti−1))2
1 − e−2ˆ η(ti−ti−1) . (2.7)
Now, substituting ˆ log(k)(ˆ η) and ˆ σ(ˆ η, ˆ log(k)) directly into the likelihood function and maximizing
with respect to ˆ η yields the desired, numerically tractable one-dimensional optimization problem.
Finally, it is worth to notice, that correction of the historical data of commodity price by adjusting
it with the PPI inﬂation, yields more reliable estimates from economic point of view and deﬁnitely helps
to avoid numerical exceptional diﬃculties in the case of unexpected, large price movements.2.3. HOW TO CALCULATE THE RAR MEASURE 16
2.2.3. Geometric Brownian Motion for currency price. For modelling currency price we sim-
ply put the Geometric Brownian Motion, commonly identiﬁed with Black-Scholes model for option price
valuation.
(2.8) dYt = µYtdt + σYtdWt,
with drift parameter µ and volatility σ.
Analogously, distribution of Yt is lognormal
logYt
d = N(µt,Y ,σ2
t,Y ).
with parameters
µt,Y = log(Yt0) + (µ −
1
2
σ2)(t − t0), σ2
t,Y = σ2(t − t0).
We leave calibration of currency model to subjective decision of any interested reader, the methods
are quite standard and require calculating historical trend and standard deviation of logarithmic returns
from currency price data. To obtain volatility closer to current market, one may apply exponentially
weighted standard deviation. Drift can be also ﬁtted to current market currency forward curve.
Formulas for mean, variance and α-quantile of Yt are same as in (2.3).
2.3. How to calculate the RaR measure
based on analytical correlations approach Having chosen the risk factor models and estimated its
parameters, we can formulate the main theorem of this chapter, introducing the analytical correlations
approach to RaR measure calculation.
Theorem 2.3.1. The RaR algorithm proposed in section (2.1) can be realized by an analytical cor-
relations approach exploiting formula (2.1).
Proof. Proceeding with the ﬁrst step of RaR calculations we search for statistics of revenues from
sale valued in PLN. Denote by βt the amount of commodity planned for sale in moment t. Thus, the
revenue from sale in time t is given by βtXtYt. Deﬁne the value of commodity in PLN by Ut = XtYt.
Assuming independence Xt of Yt, the expected value of revenues in time t results in
(2.9) βtE(Ut) = βtE(Xt)E(Yt) = βt exp
 











t,U) = N(µt,X + µt,Y ,σ2
t,X + σ2
t,Y ).
Observe by (2.10) that the desired quantile of level α for the revenues reads βtQα(Ut) and
(2.11) βtQα(Ut) = βt exp








In this way, the ﬁrst step of RaR algorithm is ﬁnished.2.3. HOW TO CALCULATE THE RAR MEASURE 17
Next, statistics for the hedging portfolio need to be found. For this purpose, deﬁne the commodity
hedging portfolio settlement result in moment t as a variable
(2.12) HX
t
def = γtYt(Kt − Xt),
with γt denoting suitable quantity and Kt – the average level of price hedged (strike).
Finding quantile Qα(HX
t ) appears not to be so straightforward, since HX
t can be viewed as a diﬀerence
between two dependent, lognormal variables γtKtYt and γtXtYt, and as such, it does not have a closed
form analytical distribution. However we can make an attempt to ﬁnd it via numerical integration. First,
omitting constant factor γt, we realize the joint distribution of the pair (Ut,Vt)
def = (XtYt,KtYt) to be
2-dimensional lognormal distribution:
(2.13) (log(Ut),log(Vt))
d = N(µt,U,µt,V ,σ2
t,U,σ2
t,V ,ρt,UV ),
with ρt,UV meaning correlation coeﬃcient between normal variables (log(Vt),log(Ut)), (µt,U,σ2
t,U)
given by (2.10), and (µt,V = µt,Y + log(Kt),σ2
t,V = σ2
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The last term does not have analytical solution, however it can be computed via numerical integration
with little care needed when cutting bounds of inﬁnite integration (lower bound tends to −∞ when q % 0).
The only unknown parameter in (2.15) left to ﬁnd, is correlation coeﬃcient ρUV . In order to ﬁgure it out,
we have to search for correlation between Ut and Vt and that is essentially correlation ρXY,Y between2.3. HOW TO CALCULATE THE RAR MEASURE 18
XtYt and Yt. Independence Xt of Yt and elementary algebra yields
Cov(XtYt,Yt) = E(Xt)Var(Yt)
and
Var(XtYt) = Var(Xt)(E(Yt))2 + Var(Yt)(E(Xt))2 + Var(Xt)Var(Yt).






















t,Y ) − 1)
.
The desired correlation coeﬃcient ρUV arises after suitable transformation of ρXY,Y , complying the












Finally, ﬁnding the desired quantile Qα(HX
t ) requires inverting (2.15) equal to α. It can be done for
instance with any optimization method without special diﬃculties. The end of step (2) of RaR algorithm,
comes with obvious formula for E(HX
t )
(2.18) E(HX
t ) = γtE(Yt)(Kt − E(Xt)).
Next step (3) of algorithm reads to ﬁnd E(βtUt + HX
t ) and Qα(βtUt + HX
t ). The ﬁrst is trivial and
approximation of the second follows from applying suitable version of (2.1):
(2.19)
Qα(βtUt + HX
t ) ≈ E(βtUt + HX




(Qα(βtUt) − E(βtUt))2 + (Qα(HX
t ) − E(HX
t ))2 + 2(Qα(βtUt) − E(βtUt))(Qα(HX
t ) − E(HX
t ))ρUH,
with p(HX
t ) denoting PLN value of premiums paid for options settling in moment t, the sign ± before
square root depending on level α of the quantile (upper/lower) and ρUH being correlation coeﬃcient
between variables βtUt and HX
t . Introducing auxiliary variable φ =
q
Var(Yt)
Var(XtYt) and again omitting
t-indexation, it can be found in the following way:
(2.20)
ρUH = corr(βtUt,HX
t ) = corr(XtYt,(Kt − Xt)Yt) =
Cov(XY,(K−X)Y ) √
Var(XY )Var((K−X)Y ) =
KCov(Y,XY )−Var(XY ) √
Var(XY )Var(KY −XY )
=
KCov(Y,XY )−Var(XY ) √





























Putting now (2.20) into (2.19) yields the ﬁnish of point (3).2.3. HOW TO CALCULATE THE RAR MEASURE 19
Obtaining step (4) – the mean and quantiles for currency hedging HY
t
def = δt(Lt − Yt) is obvious and
reads:
E(HY
t ) = δt(Lt − E(Yt)),
Qα(HY
t ) = δt(Lt − Q1−α(Y )). (2.21)
To approach the main target – calculation of statistics for revenues reduced by hedging, we apply
the same methodology and results obtained so far. Thus
(2.22) E(βtUt + HX
t + HY





t ) ≈ E(βtUt + HX
t + HY
t ) + p(HX





t ) − E(βtUt + HX
t ))2 + (Qα(HY
t ) − E(HY
t ))2 + 2(Qα(βtUt + HX
t ) − E(βtUt + HX
t ))(Qα(HY
t ) − E(HY
t ))ρUHH.
Same as before, the only unknown parameter to be found is ρUHH, being the correlation coeﬃcient be-
tween βtUt+HX
t and HY
t . And that is essentially the same as −ρUHY with ρUHY
def = corr(βtUt+HX
t ,Y ).
To calculate ρUHY , ﬁrst we need to introduce auxiliary corelation coeﬃcient ρHY
def = corr(HX
t ,Y ). Cal-
culation of ρHY follows by:
(2.24)
ρHY =
KVar(Y )−Cov(XY,Y ) √
Var(KY −XY )Var(Y ) =
KVar(Y )−Cov(XY,Y ) √


























t ,Y ) √
Var(βXY +γ(KY −XY ))Var(Y ) =



































































































The ﬁnal result of (2.23) comes with applying −ρUHY instead of ρUHH. Remark, that point (5) of
RaR algorithm can be calculated in the same way, if only applying ρHY found in (2.24). That yields to
quantifying the separate risk exposure of hedging portfolio alone.2.3. HOW TO CALCULATE THE RAR MEASURE 20
Especially important and useful with taking hedging decisions is lower quantile Qα(βtUt+HX
t +HY
t )
with α = 0.05 or α = 0.01, as leading directly to RaR measure:
(2.26) RaRα
t
def = E(βtUt + HX
t + HY
t ) − Qα(βtUt + HX
t + HY
t )
It tells the managers how big is the exposure to market risk, i.e. how much the corporation is risking
by not hedging totally its revenues. On the RaR basis, the corporation is able to decide whether to
hedge some additional part of revenues or not. Either some system of strategic limits could be introduced
exploiting RaR measure. 
Finally, it is worth to mention, that RaR can be also deﬁned as the value of revenues exposed to risk















t in taking hedging decisions could be however not eﬀective due to possible mismatch
of budget prices to the current market situation.CHAPTER 3
Some basic aspects of actuarial risk theory.
3.1. Collective risk model and ruin probabilities
In examining the nature of the risk associated with a portfolio of business, it is often of interest
to assess how the portfolio of the corporation may be expected to perform over an extended period of
time. One approach concerns the use of ruin theory (Panjer & Willmot [34]). Similarly as in the case
of operational risk management in banking, the compound Poisson distributions can be used to model
corporate operational risk and in particular, ruin theory should be applied. Ruin theory is concerned
with the excess of the income (with respect to a portfolio of business) over the outgo, or claims paid.
This quantity, referred to as insurer’s surplus, varies in time. Speciﬁcally, ruin is said to occur if the
insurer’s surplus reaches a speciﬁed lower bound, e.g. minus the initial capital. One measure of risk is
the probability of such an event, clearly reﬂecting the volatility inherent in the business. In addition, it
can serve as a useful tool in long range planning for the use of insurer’s funds.
We start with a deﬁnition of a classical risk model (see e.g. Grandell [21], and Rolski et al. [38]).
Definition 3.1.1. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space carrying Poisson process {Nt}t≥0 with intensity
λ, and sequence {Xk}∞
k=1 of independent, positive, identically distributed random variables, with mean
µ and variance σ2. Furthermore, we assume that {Xk} and {Nt} are independent. The classical risk
process {Rt}t≥0 is given by




where c is some positive constant and u is nonnegative.
This is the standard mathematical model for insurance risk. The initial capital is u, the Poisson
process Nt describes the number of claims in (0,t] interval and claim severities are random, given by
sequence {Xk}∞
k=1 with mean value µ and variance σ2, independent of Nt. To cover its liability, the
insurance company receives premium at a constant rate c, per unit time, where c = (1 + θ)λµ and θ > 0
is often called the relative safety loading. The loading has to be positive, otherwise c would be less than
λµ and thus with probability 1 the risk business would become negative in inﬁnite time.
For mathematical purposes, it is sometimes more convenient to work with a claim surplus process
process process {St}t≥0 (see e.g. Asmussen [1]), namely
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To introduce the term ruin probability, i.e. the probability that the risk process drops below zero,
ﬁrst deﬁne the time to ruin as




{St} and LT = sup
0≤t≤T
{St}.
Definition 3.1.2. The ruin probability in ﬁnite time T is given by
ψ(u,T) = P(τ(u) ≤ T) = P(LT > u)
and ruin probability in inﬁnite time is deﬁned as
(3.3) ψ(u) = P(τ(u) < ∞) = P(L > u).
We also note that obviously ψ(u,T) < ψ(u). However, the inﬁnite time ruin probability may be
sometimes also relevant for the ﬁnite time case.
In the sequel we assume c = 1, but it is not a restrictive assumption. Following Asmussen [1], let
c 6= 1 and deﬁne ˜ Rt = R t
c. Then relations between ruin probabilities ψ(u), ψ(u,T) for the process Rt
and ˜ ψ(u), ˜ ψ(u,T) for the process ˜ Rt are given by equations:
ψ(u) = ˜ ψ(u), ψ(u,T) = ˜ ψ(u,Tc).
3.2. Adjustment coeﬃcient
In ﬁnancial and actuarial mathematics there’s a distinction between light- and heavy-tailed distri-
butions (see, e.g. Embrechts et al. [16]). Distribution FX(x) is said to be light-tailed, if there exist
constants a > 0, b > 0 such that FX(x) = 1 − FX(x) ≤ ae−bx or, equivalently, if there exist z > 0, such
that MX(z) < ∞, where MX(z) is the moment generating function. Distribution FX(x) is said to be
heavy-tailed, if for all a > 0, b > 0 FX(x) > ae−bx, or, equivalently, if ∀z > 0 MX(z) = ∞.
The main claim size distributions to be studied are presented in Table 1.
Adjustment coeﬃcient (called also the Lundberg exponent) plays a key role in calculating the ruin
probability in the case of light-tailed claims.
Definition 3.2.1. Let γ = supz MX(z) < ∞ and let R be a positive solution of the equation
(3.4) 1 + (1 + θ)µR = MX(R), R < γ.
If there exists a non-zero solution to the above equation, we call such R an adjustment coeﬃcient.
Analytical solution to equation (3.4) exists only for few claim distributions. However, it is quite easy
to obtain a numerical solution. The coeﬃcient R satisﬁes the inequality
(3.5) R <
2θµ
µ(2),3.2. ADJUSTMENT COEFFICIENT 23
Table 3.1. Claim size distributions
Light-tailed distributions
name parameters pdf
exponential β > 0 fX(x) = βe−βx, x ≥ 0
gamma α > 0, β > 0 fX(x) =
β
α
Γ(α)xα−1e−βx, x ≥ 0
Weibull c > 0, τ ≥ 1 fX(x) = cτxτ−1e−cx
τ
, x ≥ 0
mixed exp’s βi > 0,
n P
i=1
ai = 1 fX(x) =
n P
i=1
(aiβie−βix), x ≥ 0
Heavy-tailed distributions
name parameters pdf
Weibull c > 0, 0 < τ < 1 fX(x) = cτxτ−1e−cx
τ
, x ≥ 0




2σ2 , x ≥ 0




xβ+1Γ(α) , x ≥ 1






, x ≥ 0
Burr α > 0, ν > 0, τ > 0 fX(x) = ατν
αx
τ−1
(ν+xτ)α+1, x ≥ 0
where µ(2) = EX2
i (cf. [1]). Let D(z) = 1 + (1 + θ)µz − MX(z). Thus, the adjustment coeﬃcient R > 0
satisﬁes the equation D(R) = 0. In order to get the solution one may use the Newton-Raphson formula




with the initial condition R0 =
2θµ
µ(2), where D0(z) = (1 + θ)µ − MX(z)0.
Moreover, if it is possible to calculate the third raw moment µ(3), we can obtain a sharper bound







and use it as a initial condition in (3.6).
We note that most of the methods of estimating the ruin probability discussed in the next chapters
require only the existence of ﬁrst two or three moments of the claim size distribution, and some of them
also the existence of the moment generating function.
Now, let us we consider the aggregate loss process St with c = 1. Put ξ(u) = Sτ(u) − u, where τ(u)
is the time to ruin deﬁned by (3.2). The following statement presents a general formula for the ruin
probability in inﬁnite time (see e.g. Asmussen [1]).
Proposition 3.2.1. Let us assume that for some R > 0 the process

eRSt	
t≥0 is a martingale and
St → −∞ a.s. on {τ(u) = ∞}. Then
(3.7) ψ(u) =
e−Ru
E(eRξ(u)| τ(u) < ∞)
.
For the classical risk model the foregoing assumptions hold and R is the adjustment coeﬃcient.CHAPTER 4
Ruin probability in ﬁnite time horizon.
From a practical point of view, ψ(u,T), where T is related to the planning horizon of the company,
may perhaps sometimes be regarded as more interesting than ψ(u). Most insurance managers will closely
follow the development of the risk business and increase the premium or the if the risk business behaves
badly. The planning horizon may be thought of as the sum of the following: the time until the risk
business is found to behave “badly”, the time until the management reacts and the time until a decision
of a premium increase takes eﬀect. Therefore, in non-life insurance, it may be natural to regard T
equal to four or ﬁve years as reasonable (Grandell [21]). Analogously, applying actuarial methodology to
operational risk management in the corporation within ﬁve year planning horizon, ψ(u,T) would be a very
interesting tool providing useful risk measurement, essential for taking accurate management decisions
and establishing required level of operational capital charge.
We also note that the situation in inﬁnite time is markedly diﬀerent from the ﬁnite horizon case as
the ruin probability in ﬁnite time can always be computed directly using Monte Carlo simulations. It
is worth to remark that generalizations of the classical risk process which are studied in ˇ Ciˇ zek, H¨ ardle
and Weron [12], Chapter 14, where the occurrence of the claims is described by point processes other
than the Poisson process (i.e., non-homogeneous, mixed Poisson and Cox processes) do not alter the ruin
probability in inﬁnite time. This stems from the following fact ([12], Chapter 14).
Fact 4.0.1. Consider a risk process ˜ Rt driven by a Cox process ˜ Nt with the intensity process ˜ λ(t),
namely







Deﬁne now Λt =
R t
0 λ(s)ds and Rt = ˜ R(Λ
−1
t ). Then the point process Nt = ˜ N(Λ
−1
t ) is a standard Poisson
process, and therefore,
˜ ψ(u) = P(inf
t≥0
{ ˜ Rt} < 0) = P(inf
t≥0
{Rt} < 0) = ψ(u).
The time scale deﬁned by Λ
−1
t is called the operational time scale. It naturally aﬀects the time to
ruin, hence the ﬁnite time ruin probability, but not the ultimate ruin probability.
The ruin probabilities in inﬁnite and ﬁnite time can only be calculated for a few special cases of the
claim amount distribution. Thus, ﬁnding a reliable approximation, especially in the ultimate case, when
the Monte Carlo method can not be utilized, is really important from a practical point of view.
In this section, ﬁrst the exact ruin probabilities in ﬁnite time are discussed, then the most important
approximations of the ﬁnite time ruin probability are presented and illustrated. One new approximation,
namely Finite De Vylder approximation, is proposed.
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To illustrate and compare approximations in this and the next sections, we use the PCS (Property
Claim Services) catastrophe data (for details, introduction and the estimations see [12], Chapter 13).
The data describes losses resulting from natural catastrophic events in USA that occurred between 1990
and 1999. This data set was used to obtain the parameters of the discussed distributions.
4.1. Exact ruin probabilities in ﬁnite time
We are now interested in the probability that the company’s capital as deﬁned by (3.1) remains non-
negative for a ﬁnite period T rather than permanently. We assume that the number of losses process Nt is
a Poisson process with rate λ, and consequently, the total claims (aggregate loss) process is a compound
Poisson process. Premiums are payable at rate c per unit time. We recall that the intensity of the process
Nt is irrelevant in the inﬁnite time case provided that it is compensated by the premium.
In contrast to the inﬁnite time case there is no general formula for the ruin probability like the
Pollaczek–Khinchin one given in the next chapter by (5.11). In the literature one can only ﬁnd a partial
integro-diﬀerential equation which satisﬁes the probability of non-ruin, see [34]. An explicit result is
merely known for the exponential losses, and even is this case a numerical integration is needed [1].
4.1.1. Exponential loss amounts. First, in order to simplify the formulae, let us assume that
losses have the exponential distribution with β = 1 and the amount of premium is c = 1. Then






























, and f3(x) = 1 + λ − 2
√
λcosx.
Now, notice that the case β 6= 1 is easily reduced to β = 1, using the formula:
(4.2) ψλ,β(u,T) = ψ λ
β ,1(βu,βT).
Moreover, the assumption c = 1 is not restrictive since we have
(4.3) ψλ,c(u,T) = ψλ/c,1(u,cT).
As an example, Table 4.1 shows the exact values of the ruin probability for exponential claims with
β = 6.3789 · 10−9 (see Chapter 13 in [12]) with respect to the initial capital u and the time horizon
T. The relative safety loading θ equals 30%. Compare to Table 15.2 in [12], Chapter 15, to see that
the values converge to those calculated in inﬁnite case as T is getting larger. The speed of convergence
decreases as the initial capital u grows.4.2. APPROXIMATIONS OF THE RUIN PROBABILITY IN FINITE TIME 26
Table 4.1. The ruin probability for exponential claims with β = 6.3789 · 10−9 and
θ = 0.3 (u in USD billion).
u 0 1 2 3 4 5
ψ(u,1) 0.757164 0.147954 0.025005 0.003605 0.000443 0.000047
ψ(u,2) 0.766264 0.168728 0.035478 0.007012 0.001286 0.000218
ψ(u,5) 0.769098 0.176127 0.040220 0.009138 0.002060 0.000459
ψ(u,10) 0.769229 0.176497 0.040495 0.009290 0.002131 0.000489
ψ(u,20) 0.769231 0.176503 0.040499 0.009293 0.002132 0.000489
Table 4.2. Monte Carlo results (50 x 10000 simulations) for mixture of two exponentials
claims with β1 = 3.5900 · 10−10, β2 = 7.5088 · 10−9, a = 0.0584 and θ = 0.3 (u in USD
billion).
u 0 1 5 10 20 50
ψ(u,1) 0.672550 0.428150 0.188930 0.063938 0.006164 0.000002
ψ(u,2) 0.718254 0.501066 0.256266 0.105022 0.015388 0.000030
ψ(u,5) 0.753696 0.560426 0.323848 0.159034 0.035828 0.000230
ψ(u,10) 0.765412 0.580786 0.350084 0.184438 0.049828 0.000726
ψ(u,20) 0.769364 0.587826 0.359778 0.194262 0.056466 0.001244
4.2. Approximations of the ruin probability in ﬁnite time
In this section, we present 5 diﬀerent approximations. We illustrate them on a common claim
size distribution example, namely the mixture of two exponentials claims with β1 = 3.5900 · 10−10,
β2 = 7.5088·10−9 and a = 0.0584 (see Chapter 13 in [12]). Numerical comparison of the approximations
is given in Section 4.3.
4.2.1. Monte Carlo method. The ruin probability in ﬁnite time can always be approximated by
means of Monte Carlo simulations. Table 4.2 shows the output for mixture of two exponentials claims
with β1, β2, a, with respect to the initial capital u and the time horizon T. The relative safety loading
θ is set to 30%. For the Monte Carlo method purposes we generated 50 x 10000 simulations. We see
that the values approach those calculated in inﬁnite case as T increases, cf. Table 15.2 in [12]. We note
that the Monte Carlo method will be used as a reference method when comparing diﬀerent ﬁnite time
approximations in Section 4.3.
4.2.2. Segerdahl normal approximation. The following result due to Segerdahl [39] is said to
be a time-dependent version of the Cram´ er–Lundberg approximation given by (5.5).
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where C = θµ/{M0






This method requires existence of the adjustment coeﬃcient. This implies that only light-tailed
distributions can be used. Numerical evidence shows that the Segerdahl approximation gives the best
results for huge values of the initial capital u, see [1].
4.2.3. Diﬀusion approximation. The idea of the diﬀusion approximation is ﬁrst to approximate
the claim surplus process St by a Brownian motion with drift (arithmetic Brownian motion) by matching
the ﬁrst two moments, and next, to note that such an approximation implies that the ﬁrst passage
probabilities are close. The ﬁrst passage probability serves as the ruin probability.
The diﬀusion approximation is given by:












where µc = λθµ, σc = λµ(2), and IG(·;ζ;u) denotes the distribution function of the passage time of
the Brownian motion with unit variance and drift ζ from the level 0 to the level u > 0 (often referred









x), see [1]. We also note that in order to apply this approximation we need the existence
of the second moment of the claim size distribution.
4.2.4. Corrected diﬀusion approximation. The idea presented above of the diﬀusion approxi-
mation ignores the presence of jumps in the risk process (the Brownian motion with drift is skip-free)
and the value Sτ(u) − u in the moment of ruin. The corrected diﬀusion approximation takes this and
other deﬁcits into consideration [1]. Under the assumption that c = 1, cf. relation (4.3), we have














where R is the adjustment coeﬃcient, δ1 = λM00
X(γ0), δ2 = M000
X(γ0)/{3M00
X(γ0)}, and γ0 satisﬁes the
equation: κ0(γ0) = 0, where κ(s) = λ{MX(s) − 1} − s.
Similarly as in the Segerdahl approximation, the method requires existence of the moment generating
function, so we can use it only for light-tailed distributions.
4.2.5. Finite time De Vylder approximation. Let us recall the idea of the De Vylder approx-
imation in inﬁnite time: we replace the claim surplus process with the one with θ = ¯ θ, λ = ¯ λ and
exponential claims with parameter ¯ β, ﬁtting ﬁrst three moments, see the next chapter. Here, the idea is
the same. First, we compute
¯ β =
3µ(2)
µ(3) , ¯ λ =
9λµ(2)
3
2µ(3)2 , and ¯ θ =
2µµ(3)
3µ(2)2 θ.
Next, we employ relations (4.2) and (4.3) and ﬁnally use the exact, exponential case formula presented
in Section 4.1.1. Obviously, the method gives the exact result in the exponential case. For other claim
distributions, the ﬁrst three moments have to exist in order to apply the approximation.4.3. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE FINITE TIME APPROXIMATIONS 28
Summarizing methods presented above, Table 4.3 shows which approximation can be used for each
claim size distribution. Moreover, the necessary assumptions on the distribution parameters are presented.
Table 4.3. Survey of approximations with an indication when they can be applied
Distribution Exp. Gamma Weibull Mix.Exp. Lognormal Pareto Burr
Method
Monte Carlo + + + + + + +
Segerdahl + + – + – – –
Diﬀusion + + + + + α > 2 ατ > 2
Corr. diﬀ. + + – + – – –
Fin. De Vylder + + + + + α > 3 ατ > 3
4.3. Numerical comparison of the ﬁnite time approximations
Now, we illustrate all 5 approximations presented in Section 4.2. We consider three claim amount
distributions which were best ﬁtted to the catastrophe data in Chapter 13 in[12], namely the mixture
of two exponentials, log-normal and Pareto distributions. The parameters of the distributions are: β1 =
3.5900 · 10−10, β2 = 7.5088 · 10−9, a = 0.0584 (mixture), µ = 18.3806, σ = 1.1052 (log-normal), and
α = 3.4081, λ = 4.4767 · 108 (Pareto). The ruin probability will be depicted as a function of u, ranging
from USD 0 to 30 billion, with ﬁxed T = 10 or with ﬁxed value of u = 20 billion USD and varying T
from 0 to 20 years. The relative safety loading is set to 30%. Figures have the same form of output. In
the left panel, the exact ruin probability values obtained via Monte Carlo simulations are presented. The
right panel describes the relative error with respect to the exact values. We also note that for the Monte
Carlo method purposes we generated 50 x 10000 simulations.
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30































0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30

































































Figure 4.1. The exact ruin probability obtained via Monte Carlo simulations (left
panel), the relative error of the approximations (right panel). The Segerdahl (short-
dashed blue line), diﬀusion (dotted red line), corrected diﬀusion (solid black line) and
ﬁnite time De Vylder (long-dashed green line) approximations. The mixture of two
exponentials case with T ﬁxed and u varying.4.3. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE FINITE TIME APPROXIMATIONS 29
First, we consider the mixture of two exponentials case. As we can see in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 the
diﬀusion approximation almost for all values of u and T gives highly incorrect results. Segerdahl and
corrected diﬀusion approximations yield similar error, which visibly decreases when the time horizon gets
bigger. The ﬁnite time De Vylder method is a unanimous winner and always gives the error below 10%.











































































































Figure 4.2. The exact ruin probability obtained via Monte Carlo simulations (left
panel), the relative error of the approximations (right panel). The Segerdahl (short-
dashed blue line), diﬀusion (dotted red line), corrected diﬀusion (solid black line) and
ﬁnite time De Vylder (long-dashed green line) approximations. The mixture of two
exponentials case with u ﬁxed and T varying.
In the case of log-normally distributed claims, we can only apply two approximations: diﬀusion and
ﬁnite time De Vylder ones, cf. Table 4.3. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict the exact ruin probability values
obtained via Monte Carlo simulations and the relative error with respect to the exact values. Again, the
ﬁnite time De Vylder approximation works much better than the diﬀusion one.
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Figure 4.3. The exact ruin probability obtained via Monte Carlo simulations (left
panel), the relative error of the approximations (right panel). Diﬀusion (dotted red
line) and ﬁnite time De Vylder (long-dashed green line) approximations. The log-normal
case with T ﬁxed and u varying.4.3. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE FINITE TIME APPROXIMATIONS 30












































































































Figure 4.4. The exact ruin probability obtained via Monte Carlo simulations (left
panel), the relative error of the approximations (right panel). Diﬀusion (dotted red
line) and ﬁnite time De Vylder (long-dashed green line) approximations. The log-normal
case with u ﬁxed and T varying.
Finally, we take into consideration the Pareto claim size distribution. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 depict the
exact ruin probability values and the relative error with respect to the exact values for the diﬀusion and
ﬁnite time De Vylder approximations. We see that now we cannot claim which approximation is better.
The error strongly depends on the values of u and T. We may only suspect that a combination of the
two methods could give interesting results.
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Figure 4.5. The exact ruin probability obtained via Monte Carlo simulations (left
panel), the relative error of the approximations (right panel). Diﬀusion (dotted red
line) and ﬁnite time De Vylder (long-dashed green line) approximations. The Pareto
case with T ﬁxed and u varying.
For more detailed analysis on the ruin approximations in ﬁnite time, see Chapter 15 in [12].4.3. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE FINITE TIME APPROXIMATIONS 31
















































































































Figure 4.6. The exact ruin probability obtained via Monte Carlo simulations (left
panel), the relative error of the approximations (right panel). Diﬀusion (dotted red
line) and ﬁnite time De Vylder (long-dashed green line) approximations. The Pareto
case with u ﬁxed and T varying.CHAPTER 5
Inﬁnite horizon.
Let us now switch to the inﬁnite time horizon management. Studying inﬁnite horizon approximations
we start from conclusions of Grandell [22]. In his paper, Grandell demonstrates that between possible
simple approximations of ruin probabilities in inﬁnite time the most successful is the De Vylder approxi-
mation, which is based on the idea to replace the risk process with the one with exponentially distributed
claims and ensuring that the ﬁrst three moments coincide.
First, we introduce in Section 5.2 a modiﬁcation to the De Vylder approximation by changing the
exponential to the gamma distribution and ﬁtting ﬁrst three moments. This modiﬁcation is promising
and works in many cases even better than the original method. Second, in contrast to the above paper,
we drop here the assumption ’simple’ and show in Section 5.4 that approximation based on the Pollaczek-
Khinchin formula gives the best results. Moreover, it works for all possible distributions of claims and
can be chosen as the reference method, see Section 5.5.
When the claim size distribution is exponential (or closely related), simple analytic results for the ruin
probability in inﬁnite time may be possible, see Section 5.1. For more general claim amount distributions,
e.g. heavy-tailed, the Laplace transform technique does not work and one may need some estimates. In
this section we will present 12 diﬀerent well-known and not so well-known approximations. Numerical
comparison of the approximations is given in Section 5.4. We also note that new approximations have
been recently proposed in the literature, see e.g. Lima et al. [29] and Us´ abel [42], but as they work for
speciﬁc classes of distributions and are far from computational simplicity, we will not consider them.
5.1. Exact ruin probabilities
Now, we are going to present a collection of basic exact results on the ruin probability in inﬁnite
time.





For more details see e.g. Grandell [21]. Notice that the formula depends only on θ, regardless of the
claim size distribution.







Gamma claims. It was shown by Grandell and Segerdahl [20] that for the gamma claim distribution
with mean 1 and α ≤ 1















[xα (1 + α(1 + θ)(x + 1)) − cos(απ)]
2 + sin2(απ)
.
The integral I has to be calculated numerically, but with some care near 0 it can be done precisely.
We notice that the assumption on the mean is no restriction since for claims X with arbitrary mean µ
we have that ψX(u) = ψ X
µ (u
µ). As the gamma distribution is closed under scale changes we obtain that
ψG(α,β)(u) = ψG(α,α)(
βu
α ) and we can now calculate the exact ruin probability via equation (5.2).
Mixture of n exponentials claims. For the claim size distribution being a mixture of n exponen-
tials with the parameters β1 < ··· < βn and weights a1,...,an, using the Laplace transform inversion,





with r1,r2,...,rn being the n positive solutions to the equation






with 0 < r1 = R < β1 < r2 < β2 < ··· < rn < βn.













In the case of mixture of two exponentials claim amounts (n = 2) a simple analytic result is given
(Panjer & Willmot [34]):
(5.4) ψ(u) =
1
(1 + θ)(r2 − r1)
{(ρ − r1)exp(−r1u) + (r2 − ρ)exp(−r2u)},
where
r1 =
ρ + θ(β1 + β2) −
h
{ρ + θ(β1 + β2)}





ρ + θ(β1 + β2) +
h
{ρ + θ(β1 + β2)}
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5.2. A survey of approximations
5.2.1. Cram´ er–Lundberg approximation. The following approximation holds.





For the proof we refer to Grandell [21]. The classical Cram´ er–Lundberg approximation yields quite
accurate results, however we must remember that in order to use it the adjustment coeﬃcient has to
exist, therefore merely the light-tailed distributions can be taken into consideration.
For exponential claims formula (5.5) yields the exact result.


























5.2.4. Beekman–Bowers approximation. The Beekman–Bowers approximation uses the follow-
ing representation of the ruin probability.
ψ(u) = P(M > u) = P(M > 0)P(M > u|M > 0).
The idea of the approximation is to replace the conditional probability 1 − P(M > u|M > 0) with a





















The Beekman–Bowers approximation gives rather accurate results, in the exponential case it becomes
the exact formula. It can be used for distributions with ﬁnite ﬁrst three moments which is always true for
exponential, gamma, lognormal, truncated normal and Weibull distributions. For loggamma distribution
we have to set β > 3, for Pareto α > 3, and for Burr ατ > 3.
5.2.5. Renyi approximation. The Renyi approximation is based on a classical result about
p-thinning, Renyi’s theorem (see [22]). It may be also derived from (5.6) when we replace the gamma
distribution function G with an exponential one, matching only the ﬁrst moment. It could be regarded







µ(2)(1+θ).5.2. A SURVEY OF APPROXIMATIONS 35
5.2.6. De Vylder approximation. The idea of this approximation is to replace the risk process





µ(3) , ¯ λ =
9λµ(2)
3
2µ(3)2 , and ¯ θ =
2µµ(3)
3µ(2)2 θ.
Then the De Vylder’s approximation is given by
ΨDV (u) =
1
1 + ¯ θ
e
−
¯ θ ¯ βu
1+¯ θ.
Obviously, in the exponential case the method gives the exact result. For other claim distributions
in order to apply the approximation, similarly as in the Beekman–Bowers approximation, the ﬁrst three
moments have to exist.
5.2.7. 4-moment gamma De Vylder approximation. Following [7] we now introduce 4-moment
gamma approximation based on the De Vylder’s idea to replace the risk process with another one for
which the expression for ψ(u) is explicit. We ﬁt the four moments in order to calculate the parameters of
the new process with gamma distributed claims and apply the exact formula for the ruin probability in
this case which is given in [20]. The risk process with gamma claims is determined by the four parameters
(¯ λ, ¯ θ, ¯ µ, ¯ µ(2)). Since
E(St) = −θλµt,
E(S2
t ) = λµ(2)t + (θλµt)2,
E(S3
t ) = λµ(3)t − 3(λµ(2)t)(θλµt) − (θλµt)2,
E(S4
t ) = λµ(4)t − 4(λµ(3)t)(θλµt) + 3(λµ(2)t)2 + 6(λµ(2)t)(θλµt)2 + (θλµt)4




(2¯ µ(2) − ¯ µ2), ¯ µ(4) =
¯ µ(2)
¯ µ2 (2¯ µ(2) − ¯ µ2)(3¯ µ(2) − 2¯ µ2),
the parameters (¯ λ, ¯ θ, ¯ µ, ¯ µ(2)) must satisfy the equations
θλµ = ¯ θ¯ λ¯ µ,
λµ(2) = ¯ λ¯ µ(2),
λµ(3) = ¯ λ
¯ µ(2)
¯ µ2 (2¯ µ(2) − ¯ µ2),
λµ(4) = ¯ λ
¯ µ(2)













(µ(2)µ(4) − 2(µ(3))2)(2µ(2)µ(4) − 3(µ(3))2)
(µ(2)µ(3))2 .
We also need to assume that µ(2)µ(4) < 3
2(µ(3))2 to ensure that ¯ µ, ¯ µ(2) > 0 and ¯ µ(2) > ¯ µ2. In case this
assumption can not be fulﬁlled, we simply set ¯ µ = µ and do not calculate the fourth moment. This case
leads to
(5.7) ¯ λ =
2λ(µ(2))2
µ(µ(3) + µ(2)µ)
, ¯ θ =
θµ(µ(3) + µ(2)µ)
2(µ(2))2 , ¯ µ = µ, ¯ µ(2) =
µ(µ(3) + µ(2)µ)
2µ(2) .
All in all, we get the approximation
(5.8) ψ4MG(u) =




1 + (1 + ¯ θ)R − (1 + ¯ θ)(1 − R
¯ α)
+







x¯ αe−(x+1)¯ βu dx

x¯ α  






R is the adjustment coeﬃcient for the gamma distribution and (¯ α, ¯ β) are given by ¯ α =
¯ µ
2
¯ µ(2)−¯ µ2, ¯ β =
¯ µ
¯ µ(2)−¯ µ2.
In the exponential and gamma case this method gives the exact results. For other claim distributions
in order to apply the approximation, the ﬁrst four (or three) moments have to exist. In Section 5.4 will
show that it gives a slight correction to the De Vylder approximation, which is said in Grandell [22] to
be the best among simple approximations.
5.2.8. Heavy traﬃc approximation. The term ’heavy traﬃc’ comes from queuing theory. In risk
theory it means that on the average the premiums exceed only slightly the expected claims. It implies








This method requires the existence of the ﬁrst two moments of the claim size distribution, so we assume:
β > 2 for the loggamma case, α > 2 for the Pareto case, and ατ > 2 for the Burr case.5.2. A SURVEY OF APPROXIMATIONS 37
5.2.9. Light traﬃc approximation. As for heavy traﬃc, the term ’light traﬃc’ comes from queu-
ing theory, but has an obvious interpretation also in risk theory, namely, on the average, the premiums
are much larger than the expected claims. It implies that the safety loading θ is positive and large. We





In risk theory heavy traﬃc is most often argued to be the typical case rather than light traﬃc. However,
light traﬃc is of some interest as a complement to heavy traﬃc, as well as it is needed for the interpolation
approximation to be studied in the next point.













see [1]. The particular features of this approximation is that it is exact for the exponential distribution
and asymptotically correct both in light and heavy traﬃc.
5.2.11. Heavy-tailed claims approximation. First, let us introduce the class of subexponential















= n; n ≥ 2

.
The class contains lognormal and Weibull (for τ < 1) distributions. Moreover, all distributions
with a regularly varying tail (e.g. loggamma, Pareto and Burr distributions) are subexponential. For
subexponential distributions we can formulate the following approximation of the ruin probability. If











see [1]. This method can be used for Weibull, lognormal, loggamma, Pareto and Burr distributions.
5.2.12. Computer approximation via the Pollaczek–Khinchin formula. This time we use
the representation (3.3) of the ruin probability and the decomposition of the maximum M as a sum of
ladder heights. Let L1 be the value that process {St} reaches for the ﬁrst time above the zero level. Next,
let L2 be the value which is obtained for the ﬁrst time above the level L1; L3,L4,... are deﬁned in the
same way. The values Lk are called ladder heights. Since the process {St} has stationary and independent
increments, {Lk}∞
k=1 is the sequence of independent and identically distributed variables. One may show
that the number of ladder heights K to the moment of ruin is given by a geometric distribution with
parameters p = 1
1+θ and q = θ
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The above fact together with the representation (3.3) leads to the Pollaczek–Khinchin formula for
the ruin probability:











where B0 is the tail of the distribution function corresponding to the density b0 and B∗0
0 (u) ≡ I{u≥0}.
One can use the formula to derive explicit solutions for a number of claim amount distributions, see
e.g. [1] or [34]. If it is not possible, this formula can be applied directly to calculate the ruin probability.
It incorporates an inﬁnite sum, hence we use the Monte Carlo method. From (5.11) the ruin probability
ψ(u) = EZ, where Z = 1(M > u), may be generated as follows.
SIMULATION ALGORITHM
(1) Generate a random variable K from the geometric distribution with the parameters p = 1
1+θ
and q = θ
1+θ.
(2) Generate random variables X1,X2,··· ,XK from the density b0(x).
(3) Calculate M = X1 + X2 + ··· + XK.
(4) If M > u, let Z = 1, otherwise let Z = 0.
The main problem seems to be simulating random variables from the density b0(x).
Proposition 5.2.1. The density b0(x) has a closed form only for four of the considered distributions,
namely
(i) for exponential claims, b0(x) is the density of the same exponential distribution,















(iii) for Pareto claims, b0(x) is the density of the Pareto distribution with the parameters α −1 and
ν,
(iv) for Burr claims, b0(x) is the density of the transformed beta distribution.
Proof. (i) For exponential claims
FX(x) = e−βx, µ =
1
β
,5.2. A SURVEY OF APPROXIMATIONS 39
thus
b0(x) = βFX(x) = βe−βx,
which yields again the exponential distribution, with parameter β.




















β1 + ··· + an
βn
FX1(x) + ··· +
an
a1
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βn
fXn(x),











































which again gives the Pareto distribution with parameters (α − 1, ν).






























































The foregoing formula represents the density from the transformed beta distribution with parameters a,
b, c and d. This distribution comes as a quotient of two variables from generalized gamma distribution
with corresponding parameters (for details see [34]). 5.4. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE METHODS 40
For other distributions treated in this paper in order to generate random variables Xk we use for-
mula (5.10) and controlled, numerical integration. The described above computer approximation via the
Pollaczek–Khinchin formula will be called in short the Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation. We note that
the approximation works for all considered distributions of claims.
5.3. Summary of the approximations
Table 5.1 shows which approximation can be used for a particular choice of a claim size distribution.
Moreover, the necessary assumptions on the distribution parameters are included.
Table 5.1. Survey of approximations with an indication when they can be applied
distribution → Exp. Gamma Weibull Mix.Exp. Lognormal Loggamma Pareto Burr
method ↓
Cram´ er-Lundberg + + – + – – – –
Exponential + + + + + β > 3 α > 3 ατ > 3
Lundberg + + + + + β > 3 α > 3 ατ > 3
Beekman–Bowers + + + + + β > 3 α > 3 ατ > 3
Renyi + + + + + β > 2 α > 2 ατ > 2
De Vylder + + + + + β > 3 α > 3 ατ > 3
4-m. gamma De Vylder + + + + + β > 3 α > 3 ατ > 3
Heavy Traﬃc + + + + + β > 2 α > 2 ατ > 2
Light Traﬃc + + + + + + + +
Heavy-Light Traﬃc + + + + + β > 2 α > 2 ατ > 2
Heavy-tailed – – 0 < τ < 1 – – + + +
Pollaczek–Khinchin + + + + + + + +
5.4. Numerical comparison of the methods
We now aim to compare all 12 approximations presented in the preceding section in few cases of loss
amount distribution. To this end we consider the ruin probability as a function of the initial capital u.
In order to show the relative errors of the methods we compare results of the approximations with the
exact values, which can be done in the exponential, gamma and mixture of exponentials case, partially
in the lognormal case, or the results obtained via the Pollaczek–Khinchin formula, which we feel, and
justify it numerically, can be the reference method. For the Monte Carlo method purposes we generate
100 blocks of 100000 simulations.
For the exponential case Cram´ er-Lundberg, Renyi, Beekman–Bowers, De Vylder and 4-moment
gamma De Vylder approximations yield the exact result given by formula (5.1). We will usually as-
sume that the mean of the claim distribution is equal to 1 and θ = 0.1.
In the gamma case we can obtain exact values via formula (5.2) and use them in order to compare
all methods except heavy-tailed and 4-moment gamma De Vylder approximations, which yield the exact
result. When α = 0.01 and β = 0.01, see Figure 5.1, all approximations except the heavy, light (disastrous
results) and heavy-light traﬃc, give the relative error less than 3%.5.4. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE METHODS 41










































































Figure 5.1. Illustration of the ruin probability (a) and the relative error (b) of the
approximations. The gamma case with α = 0.01, β = 0.01, θ = 0.1 and u ≤ 1000.
When the claim distribution is a mixture of three exponentials, see Figure 5.2, Cram´ er–Lundberg,
De Vylder 4-moment gamma De Vylder and exponential approximations give quite accurate results,
Beekman–Bowers and Lundberg approximations are just acceptable.














































































Figure 5.2. Illustration of the ruin probability (a) and the relative error (b) of the
approximations. The mixture of three exponentials case with β1 = 0.014631, β2 =
0.190206, β3 = 5.514588, weight a1 = 0.0039793, a2 = 0.1078392, a3 = 0.8881815,
θ = 0.1 and u ≤ 1000.
Since there are no exact methods for other considered distributions, we are going to calculate the
relative errors with respect to the most accurate method. From Figure 5.1-5.2 the possible candidates
are Cram´ er–Lundberg, De Vylder, 4-moment gamma De Vylder and Pollaczek–Khinchin approxima-
tions. However, we must notice that the Cram´ er–Lundberg approximation works only for light-tailed
distributions, hence we have to decide between both De Vylder and Pollaczek–Khinchin approximations.
To this end we take into consideration a mixture of three exponential distributions and a lognormal
distribution. For simple analytic results in the former case see Section 5.2. In the latter case, with5.5. POLLACZEK–KHINCHIN APPROXIMATION AS THE REFERENCE METHOD 42
Table 5.2. Comparison of De Vylder, 4-moment gamma De Vylder and Pollaczek–
Khinchin approximations under mixture of three exponentials and lognormal distribu-
tions. Relative errors in (%).
mixture of three exponentials lognormal
θ u Ψ(u) EPK EDV E3MGDV u Ψ(u) EPK EDV E3MGDV
0.05 10 0.8897 0.0151 -3.2089 -1.6062 100 0.55074 -0.0182 -20.6159 -19.2468
0.10 10 0.7993 -0.0281 -5.4247 -2.6773 100 0.34395 0.0087 -19.4825 -18.4852
0.15 10 0.7242 -0.0320 -6.9981 -3.4102 100 0.23573 -0.02545 -14.2281 -13.6088
0.20 10 0.6611 0.0075 -8.1485 -3.8859 100 0.17309 0.0983 -8.0883 -7.8052
0.25 10 0.6073 -0.00280 -8.9791 -4.1874 100 0.13384 0.0448 -2.0547 -2.0622
0.30 10 0.5610 -0.0366 -9.5811 -4.3583 100 0.10765 0.21367 3.5300 3.2606
1.00 10 0.2634 -0.0566 -10.6644 -2.9803 100 0.02535 0.0789 41.7278 39.6726
0.05 100 0.7144 -0,0018 0.3737 0.2967 1000 0.04199 2.6530 55.0917 53.1769
0.10 100 0.5393 -0.0170 1.1125 0.6082 1000 0.01099 4.0218 85.5323 87.9436
0.15 100 0.4247 -0.0590 1.9143 0.8429 1000 0.00574 3.92334 79.6690 87.7003
0.20 100 0.3455 0.0179 2.7120 1.0304 1000 0.00384 2.7917 68.6979 81.0365
0.25 100 0.2886 0.0237 3.3784 1.1019 1000 0.00288 3.2431 59.1632 74.5937
0.30 100 0.2461 0.0264 3.9862 1.1418 1000 0.00230 3.3304 51.8174 69.5435
1.00 100 0.0724 -0.2033 7.2086 -0.0773 1000 0.00060 6.3000 19.8233 46.7283
0.05 1000 0.1149 -0.0159 0.0087 -0.0087 10000 0.00008 2.5000 -99.9996 -99.999
0.10 1000 0.0210 -0.2071 -0.9429 0.0190 10000 0.00004 -9.5000 -100.0000 -100.0000
0.15 1000 0.0054 -0.7574 -3.7000 -0.2889 10000 0.00002 27.0000 -100.0000 -100.0000
0.20 1000 0.0018 -3.5056 -8.4000 -1.3167 10000 0.00002 -15.0000 -100.0000 -100.0000
0.25 1000 0.0007 0.2714 -10.5714 1.4343 10000 0.00001 50.0000 -100.0000 -100.0000
0.30 1000 0.0003 7.7333 -8.8700 9.7900 10000 0.00001 22.0000 -100.0000 -100.0000
1.00 1000 0.0000 – – – 10000 0.00000 – – –
a choice of speciﬁc parameters, exact values of the ruin probability can be computed using numerical
inversion of Laplace transform technics, see Wikstad [43], Thorin & Wikstad [41]. Let us now compare
the three approximations. In Table 5.2 the exact and approximated values, and relative errors are shown
with respect to u and θ with the distribution parameters like in [20], cf. Figure 5.2 and 5.3.
It is easy to notice that De Vylder and 4-moment gamma De Vylder are no match for the Pollaczek–
Khinchin approximation, see the boldfaced results. This and Figure 5.1-5.2 justify the thesis that the
Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation can be chosen as the reference method. Moreover, it is worth noting
that in the light-tailed cases the 4-moment gamma De Vylder approximation gives much more accurate
results than the original method. Henceforth we will compare the methods with respect to the values
obtained via the Pollaczek–Khinchin formula.
5.5. Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation as the reference method
In the lognormal case, see Figure 5.3, the situation is very interesting. All methods give the error
greater then 50%. The lognormal case is quite important as often loss data appear to have the lognormal5.5. POLLACZEK–KHINCHIN APPROXIMATION AS THE REFERENCE METHOD 43
distribution. Thus we may say that using the Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation is essential when dealing
with real-life data.










































































Figure 5.3. Illustration of the ruin probability (a) and the relative error (b) of the
approximations (with respect to the Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation). The lognormal
case with µ = −1.62 i σ = 1.8, θ = 0.1 and u ≤ 1000.









































































Figure 5.4. Illustration of the ruin probability (a) and the relative error (b) of the
approximations (with respect to the Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation). The Pareto
case with α = 3.1, ν = 2.1, θ = 0.01 and u ≤ 1000.
For the Pareto distributed claims, see Figure 5.4, all methods produce the error up to about 20%,
light traﬃc and heavy-tailed approximations show a total lack of accuracy. The parameters of the Pareto
distribution imply that the ﬁrst three moments still exist. In the cases when it is not true, only a few
approximations remain useful.
Finally, we claim, that the approximation via the Pollaczek–Khinchin formula is the best method for
calculating the ruin probability in inﬁnite time:
• Only two of 12 considered approximations work for all distributions, namely Pollaczek–Khinchin
and light traﬃc. From Figure 5.1-5.2 it is clear that the former is much better.5.5. POLLACZEK–KHINCHIN APPROXIMATION AS THE REFERENCE METHOD 44
• Figure 5.1-5.2 demonstrate that among all presented approximations which work for the light-
and heavy-tailed distributions only De Vylder, 4-moment gamma De Vylder and Pollaczek–
Khinchin behave well.
• In Table 5.2 the exact and approximated values of the three approximations, and relative errors
with respect to u and θ are shown. It is easy to notice that both De Vylder approximations
are no match for the Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation, see the boldfaced results. This and
Figure 5.1-5.2 justify the thesis that the Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation can be chosen as
the reference method
• The Pollaczek–Khinchin approximation gives the most accurate results, even for the class of
heavy-tailed distributions like lognormal. We also note that in each case for the Monte Carlo
method purposes we generated 100 blocks of 100000 simulations and the variance within the
results derived from the blocks was always relatively small.
More detailed analysis and a wider variety of loss distributions studied can be found in [12], Chapter
15, and in papers by Burnecki, Mi´ sta and Weron ([9], [7]).CHAPTER 6
Diﬀusion model with losses given by mixture of exponentials.
This chapter is devoted to an extension of classical risk process to more general form, i.e. risk
process that, between jumps, follows Brownion motion Bt with drift. An easy to compute formula for
ruin probability when the Laplace transform of the claim size distribution is a rational function, is given.
Moreover, for the mixture of exponentials an analytic formula is found in details. The general ideas and
some parts of the proof are heavily borrowed from the papers by Jacobsen ([25], [26], [27]).
Let (Ω,F,Ft,Px) be a probability space with ﬁltration Ft and with Markov state space E. The set
of measurable and bounded functions f : E → R equipped with a supremum norm is a Banach space.
For all t ∈ R+ deﬁne the contracting semigroup of operators
Ptf(x) = Exf(xt).














For the risk process of the form:




the inﬁnitesimal generator is given by






FX(dy)(f(x − y) − f(x)).
Lemma 6.0.1. Let f : R → R be a bounded function with f ∈ C2B2(R+) – twice continuously
diﬀerentiable with up to second derivative bounded on R+. Then, by Itˆ o’s formula and the martingale
representation, we get the following formula
(6.3) f(Rτ∧t) = f(R0) +
Z τ∧t
0
Af(Rs) ds + Mt,
for M being Ft-martingale starting from zero (M0 ≡ 0).
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For the proof involving martingale representations and suitable version of Itˆ o’s formula, we refer
reader to [27], or to any book devoted to martingale theory.
6.1. Laplace transform of claims being rational function
Let us distinguish now between the ruin caused by a jump and ruin by continuity. Denote the
corresponding sets of events by:
Aj = {Rτ < 0, τ < ∞}, and Ac = {Rτ = 0, τ < ∞}.
Then the ruin probability of the risk process given by (6.1) starting from R0 has the form
(6.4) PR0(τ < ∞) = PR0(Aj) + PR0(Ac).
We will need also the following notation: for z ∈ C let q(z) = φ(z) − λ = βz + 1
2σ2z2 − λ, where
φ(z) = βz + 1
2σ2z2 is a polynomial of degree ≤ 2 associated with the scaled Brownian motion with drift
that risk process follows between jumps caused by claims occurrences.
The further important assumption we require is that the Laplace transform LX of the distribution
of claims is a rational function, i.e.
(6.5) LX(ν) = Eexp(−νX) =
PX(ν)
QX(ν)
with ν ≥ 0 and PX,QX being the polynomials with no common complex roots and the leading coeﬃcient
for QX equal to 1. It follows that if the degree of QX is m, P has to be of degree ≤ m. However, we
need PX(z) and QX(z) for all z ∈ C, the extension of LX to ¯ LX(z) =
PX(z)
QX(z) leads to Eexp(−zX), that is
only guaranteed for z with Re(z) > − and  small enough. This implies that all the m roots of QX(z)
satisfy Re(z) < 0.
In order to state the proposition, we need the following two versions of the Cram` er-Lundberg equation:








σ2γ2 − λ) = −λPX(γ).
Proposition 6.1.1. For R0 > 0, ruin probability PR0(τ < ∞) = 1 if and only if
(6.8) β ≤ λEX .













Xn.6.1. LAPLACE TRANSFORM OF CLAIMS BEING RATIONAL FUNCTION 47
It is clear, that the second term on the right side converges to 0 a.s., and the term with the sum to λEX.
Thus Rt → −∞ PR0 −a.s. if β < λEX and Rt → +∞ PR0 −a.s. if β > λEX. So the sharp inequality in
(6.8) implies ruin probability Pruin equal to 1, and also if (6.8) does not hold, there’s nonzero probability,
that drift of Rt goes to ∞ before any claim has arrived, so Pruin < 1. For equality in (6.8) we may
consider risk process with β −  instead of β and the result comes from taking  & 0. 
Note, that γ = 0 is always the solution to the Cram` er-Lundberg equations (6.6), (6.7). We will show,
that Pruin < 1, implies that equation (6.7) has exactly m + 1 solutions with Re(γ) < 0. The next result
is a slight modiﬁcation of Theorem 1 in [27].
Proposition 6.1.2. Let us consider the risk process Rt in the form of (6.1) with Laplace transform




, degree(Q) = m.
(i) If Pruin < 1, then the Cram` er-Lundberg equation (6.7) has precisely m+1 solutions (γl)1≤l≤m+1
with Re(γl) < 0,
(ii) γl : Re(γl) < 0 is a solution to (6.6) if and only if γl is a solution to the modiﬁed Cram` er-
Lundberg equation (6.7) with q(γl) = βγl + 1
2σ2γ2
l − λ 6= 0,
(iii) If (˜ γk)1≤k≤m are any m of the (m + 1) solutions to (6.6) with Re(˜ γk) < 0 and these solutions
are distinct with q(˜ γk) = β˜ γk + 1
2σ2˜ γ2




















with rk given by




k06=k(˜ γk − ˜ γk0)
,
(iv) If Pruin < 1 and all the solutions (γl)1≤l≤m+1 to (6.6) with Re(γl) < 0 are distinct and q(γl) 6=
0, using (6.10) twice with, say, (˜ γk)1≤k≤m = (γ1,...,γm−1,γm+s), s = {0,1}, we obtain a
system of 2 linear equations with unknowns PR0(Aj) and PR0(Ac), that can be solved uniquely
provided matrix of coeﬃcients is non-singular.
Proof. We proceed to discuss (iii), as (ii) and (iv) seems to be obvious. Let (γ1,...,γm) be m






k=1 ck exp(γkx) x ≥ 0






, K = −
m X
k=1
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and rk as in (6.11) above.
Next we aim to show
(6.14) Af(x) = 0, x ≥ 0.
Then consequently by (6.3), for any t ≥ 0 holds




ER0 [f(Rt); τ > t] = 0,
for Pruin = 1 is obvious since f is bounded. If Pruin < 1 by Proposition (6.1.1) limt→∞ Rt = ∞ a.s.,
which together with Re(γk) < 0 and deﬁnition of f implies that limt→∞ f(Rt) = 0. Now (6.16) follows
by dominated convergence. Clearly letting t → ∞ in (6.3) yields
ER0 [f(Rτ); τ < ∞] = f(R0),





ck; Rτ = 0
#
























































With x = 0, the above takes the form
Pm
k=1 rk + K and is equal to 0 by deﬁnition of K.







FX(dy)ck exp(γk(x − y))

+ K(1 − FX(x)) = 0,
and because all Re(γk) < 0, it holds if and only if it holds for the Laplace transform. Multiplying by
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k=1(ckν + rk(ν − γk))πk(ν)
, where πk(ν) =
Y
k06=k
(ν − γk0). (6.17)
Lemma 6.1.1. Suppose S is a polynomial of degree ≤ m − 1 and γ1,...,γm are complex, distinct







Continuing with (6.17), inserting rk = −
PX(γk)

































and by Cram` er-Lundberg equation (6.7), λ
q(γk) + 1 =
PX(γk)−QX(γk)
















The latter comes with lemma (6.1.1) applied with polynomial S of the form S(z) =
QX(z)−PX(z)
z (degree
of S ≤ m − 1 since z = 0 is always the root to Q − P). That completes the proof of (iii).
We proceed with the proof of (i). Remind both sides of Cram` er-Lundberg equation (6.7) are poly-
nomials and the left side of (6.7), let us denote it by Sl, is a polynomial of degree m + 2. Similarly Sr
is of degree ≤ m − 1. As two roots to q(γ) are γ± = 1
σ2(−β ±
p
β2 + 2λσ2), we conclude Sl has exactly
m + 1 roots with Re(γ) < 0.
Let us recall now Rouch´ e theorem from complex function theory (see e.g. [24]).
Fact 6.1.1. (Rouch´ e Theorem) Consider functions f and g on compact set U ⊆ C, let ∂U be a
curve bounding U. Assume f,g : U → C are analytical on U and following inequality holds
(6.19) |f(z)| > |g(z)|, for z ∈ ∂U.
Then f and f + g has the same number of roots on U.6.1. LAPLACE TRANSFORM OF CLAIMS BEING RATIONAL FUNCTION 50
Returning to proof of (i), let ρ > 0 be given and 0 <  < ρ be small enough to ensure q(z) 6= 0 for
|z| ≤  and ¯ LX(z) to exist. Consider the open set Uρ, given by the interior of the curve (boundary):
∂U = {z : |z| = ρ, Re(z) < 0} ∪ {z : z = iy, y ∈ R,  ≤ |y| ≤ ρ,} ∪ {z : |z| = , Re(z) < 0}.
Take f ≡ Sl, g ≡ −Sr. To imply the claim in (i) by Rouch´ e theorem, it is suﬃcient to show
|−Sr| < |Sl| for z ∈ ∂U, ρ large enough and  small enough.











• For |z| = ρ with ρ suﬃciently large (6.20) holds as degree(Sl) > degree(Sr),


















4σ4y4 + β2y2 + λσ2y2 + λ2
holds since y 6= 0.
• We are left with the case |z| = , Re(z) < 0. Since for  suﬃciently small PX(z) 6= 0, inequality











1  ¯ LX(z)
 .
Consider following functions, being sides of above inequality, gl(z) = λ
βz+ 1
2σ2z2−λ and gr(z) =
1
|¯ LX(z)|. Both are analytical near 0 with gl(0) = 1, gr(0) = 1. For z = x + iy close to 0, using
Taylor expansion, we arrive at
|g(z)|
2 = g2(0) + 2xg(0)g0(0) + y2(g0(0)2 − g(0)g00(0)) + o(x) + o(y2).




l (0) − g00
l (0)) < y2(g02






l (0) − g00
l (0) < g02
r (0) − g00
r(0).
Since g0
r(0) = EX, g00
r(0) = −(EX2 − 2(EX)2), then
g02
r (0) − g00
r(0) = VarX > 0.










l (0) − g00





l (0) − g00
l (0) < g02




since β > λEX comes with proposition (6.1.1). The latter ends the proof of (i).
6.2. MIXTURE OF EXPONENTIALS CLAIMS 51
6.2. Mixture of exponentials claims
Next we aim to focus on mixture of exponential distributions as a key distribution in further consid-
erations. Mixture of m exponential distribution, say given by FX(ν) =
Pm
i=1 ai(1 − exp(−δiν)), surely

















is well deﬁned for ν > −mini=1,...,m{δi} and PX, QX are polynomials respectively of degree m and




(δj + γ)(βγ +
1
2







Solving above equation amounts to ﬁnding the zeros of a polynomial of degree m + 1 with γ = 0
always a root. It can always be computed with no special diﬃculties. At this moment we are ready to
state the main theorem that gives exact formulas for ruin probability in discussed case.
Theorem 6.2.1. Let us consider the risk process Rt in the form of (6.1) with claim sizes following
mixture of m exponential distributions FX with parameters (a1,...,am) and (δ1,...,δm). To ensure





(i) the Cram` er-Lundberg equation (6.22) has precisely m+1 solutions (γk)1≤k≤m+1 with Re(γk) <
0,
(ii) If all the solutions (γk)1≤k≤m+1 to (6.22) with Re(γk) < 0 are distinct and q(γk) = βγk +
1
2σ2γ2


































































Proof. The ﬁrst part (i) of Theorem follows directly from (i) of Proposition 6.1.2 and Proposition
6.1.1. To arrive at (ii) one needs to use (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 6.1.2, let’s say, for (γ1,...,γm) and
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That completes the proof of Theorem 6.2.1. 
Finally, let us emphasize the results obtained here in this chapter are important for operational risk
modelling. First, modelling operational risk process by classical model with diﬀusion component allows
to ﬁt the model closer to real life situations. For the second, as it was noticed in Chapter 1, mixtures
of distributions are naturally exploited distributions in operational risk modelling. Hence any analytical
solution in this ﬁeld is of signiﬁcant importance.CHAPTER 7
Building operational reserves.
7.1. Introduction
In this chapter, setting the appropriate level of capital charge c for operational risk is considered
in a broader context of business decisions, concerning also risk transfer through insurance. The ideas
are taken and reformulated from insurance risk theory. For detailed discussion on setting the level of
insurance premium in the environment of insurance risk process with reinsurance and rate of return on
capital, see Otto and Mi´ sta [30].
At ﬁrst, the simple version of the problem is solved to illustrate the idea of the chapter. Let us
consider our model of an operational risk process based on (3.1) describing capital assets or proﬁt of a
company exposed to operational losses, in the basic form:
Rt = u + ct − St, t ≥ 0,
where Rt denotes the current capital at time t, u = R0 stands for critical level of capital, that should
never be exceeded under threat of bankruptcy, c is the amount of operational capital charge to cover one
year losses, and St is the aggregate loss process – amount of loss outlays over the period (0,t]. Let us
assume that increments of the aggregate loss process St+h − St are for any t,h > 0 normally distributed
N(µh,σ2h) and mutually independent.
In this case the probability of ruin is an exponential function of the initial capital:
ψ(u) = exp(−Ru), u ≥ 0,
where the adjustment coeﬃcient R exists for c > µ, and equals then 2(c − µ)σ−2. The above formula
can be easily inverted to render the operational reserves c for a given critical capital or proﬁt u and
predetermined level ψ of ruin probability:




Given the safety standard ψ, the larger the expected budget gain (or critical level of capital) u of the
company is, the lower reserves c it does need to cover the operational risk.
Throughout the rest of chapter, the above simplistic assumptions on the risk process can be dropped.
It is shown there how to invert various approximate formulas for the ruin probability in order to calculate
necessary capital charge for the whole business as well as to decompose it into individual business risks
lines. Finally, an extension of the decision problem by allowing for additional insurance is considered.
We assume that we typically have at our disposal incomplete information on the distribution of the
aggregate loss, and this incomplete information set consists of cumulants of order 1, 2, 3, and possibly
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4. The rationale is that sensible empirical investigation of frequency and severity distributions could be
done only separately for sub-portfolios (business lines) of homogeneous risks. Cumulants for the whole
business are then obtained just by summing up ﬁgures over the collection of sub-portfolios, provided that
sub-portfolios are mutually independent. Both the quantile of the current year loss and the probability
of ruin in the long run will be approximated by formulas based on cumulants of the one-year aggregate
loss W.
7.2. Ruin probability criterion
Presuming long-run horizon for operational reserves calculation we widely exploit the ruin theory.
Our aim is now to obtain such a level of operational capital charge c needed to cover each year the
aggregate loss W, which results from a proﬁt u presumed in budget (or other critical level of capital, that
cannot be lost) and accepted level of ruin probability ψ. This is done by inverting various approximate
formulae for the probability of ruin. Information requirements of diﬀerent methods are emphasized. For
details on the variety of approximations look for in previous chapters.
7.2.1. Approximation based on Lundberg inequality. This is a simplest (and crude) approx-
imation method, simply assuming replacement of the true function ψ(u) by:
ψLi (u) = e−Ru.










to obtain directly the reserve amount formula:






where CW denotes the cumulant generating function and c(W) the yearly capital charge enough to cover
each year loss W. The result is well known as the exponential premium formula in insurance. It possesses
several desirable properties – not only that it is derivable from ruin theory. First of all, by the virtue of
properties of the cumulant generating function, it is additive for independent risks. So there is no need to
distinguish between marginal and basic reserves for individual risk lines. The formula can be practically
applied once we replace the adjustment coeﬃcient R by its approximation R(Li).















R3c4,W + ...,7.2. RUIN PROBABILITY CRITERION 55
















Some insight into the nature of the long-run criteria for capital charge calculation could be gained by
re-arrangement of the formula (7.1). At ﬁrst we could express the u level in units of standard deviation
of the aggregate loss: U = uσ
−1





and reserve formula (7.1) as:






















where in the brackets appear only unit-less ﬁgures, that form together the pricing formula for the stan-
dardized risk (W − µW)σ
−1
W . Let us notice that the contribution of higher order terms in the expansion
is neglectible when u is large enough. The above phenomenon could be interpreted as a result of risk
diversiﬁcation in time (as opposed to cross-sectional risk diversiﬁcation). Provided the proﬁt capital is
large, the ruin (if it happens at all) will rather appear as a result of aggregation of poor results over many
periods of time. However, given the skewness and kurtosis of one-year increment of the risk process,
the sum of increments over n periods has skewness of order n− 1
2, kurtosis of order n−1 etc. Hence the
larger the critical capital, the smaller importance of the diﬀerence between the distribution of the yearly
increment and the normal distribution. In a way this is how the diversiﬁcation of risk in time works (as
opposed to cross-sectional diversiﬁcation). In the case of a cross-sectional diversiﬁcation the assumption
of mutual independency of risks plays the crucial role. Analogously, diversiﬁcation of risk in time works
eﬀectively when subsequent increments of the risk process are independent.
7.2.2. “Zero” approximation. The “zero” approximation is a kind of naive approximation, as-
suming replacement of the function ψ(u) by:
ψ0 (u) = (1 + θ)
−1 exp(−Ru),
where θ denotes the relative security loading, which means that (1 + θ) =
c(W)
E(W). The “zero” approx-
imation is applicable to the case of Poisson loss arrivals (as opposed to Lundberg inequality, which is
applicable under more general assumptions). Relying on “zero” approximation leads to the system of
two equations:
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and next by executing iterations:







that under reasonable circumstances converge quite quickly to the solution R(0) = lim
n→∞
R(n), which
allows applying formula (7.1) for the whole portfolio and formula (7.2) for individual risks, provided the
coeﬃcient R is replaced by its approximation R(0).
7.2.3. Cram´ er–Lundberg approximation. Operational reserve calculation could also be based
on the Cram´ er-Lundberg approximation. In this case the problem can be reduced also to the system of
equations (three this time):








Y (R) − µY (1 + θ)






Y (·) and µY denote respectively the ﬁrst order derivative of the moment generating function
and the expectation of the severity distribution. Solution of the system in respect of unknowns c(W), θ
and R requires now a bit more complex calculations. Obtained result R(CL) could be used then to replace
R in formulas (7.1) and (7.2). The method is applicable to the case of Poisson loss arrivals. Moreover,
severity distribution has to be known in this case. It can be expected that the method will produce
accurate results for large u.
7.2.4. Beekman–Bowers approximation. This method is often recommended as the one which
produces relatively accurate approximations, especially for moderate amounts of u. The problem consists
in solving the system of three equations:
ψ = (1 + θ)
−1 {1 − Gα,β (u)}
α
β














where Gα,β denotes the cdf of the gamma distribution with parameters (α,β), and mk,Y denotes the
raw moment of order k of the severity distribution. Last two equations arise from equating moments of
the gamma distribution to conditional moments of the maximal loss distribution (provided the maximal
loss is positive). Solving this system of equation is a bit cumbersome, as it involves multiple numerical
evaluations of the cdf of the gamma distribution. The admissible solution exists provided m3,Y m1,Y >
m2
2,Y , that is always satisﬁed for arbitrary severity distribution with support on the positive part of the
axis. Denoting the solution for the unknown θ by θBB, we can write the latter as a function:
θBB = θBB (u,ψ,m1,Y ,m2,Y ,m2,Y ),7.2. RUIN PROBABILITY CRITERION 57
and obtain the reserve c(W) from the equation:
cBB (W) = (1 + θBB)E(W).
Formally, application of the method requires only moments of ﬁrst three orders of the severity distribution
to be ﬁnite. However, the problem arises when we wish to price individual risks (or business line risks).
Then we have to know the moment generating function of the severity distribution, and it should obey
conditions for adjustment coeﬃcient to exist. If this is a case, we can replace the coeﬃcient θ of the
equation:
MY (R) = 1 + (1 + θ)m1,Y R
by its approximation θBB, and thus obtain the approximation R(BB) of the adjustment coeﬃcient R. It
allows calculating capital charge according to formulas (7.1) and (7.2). It is easy to verify that there is




7.2.5. Diﬀusion approximation. This approximation method requires the scarcest information.







R(D) = 2{c(W) − µW}σ
−2
W ,
in order to obtain the reserve:







that again is easily decomposable for individual risks. The formula is equivalent to the exponential
formula (7.1), where all terms except the ﬁrst two are omitted.
7.2.6. De Vylder approximation. The method requires information on moments of the ﬁrst three












where for simplicity the abbreviated notation ρ
def = 1
3σWγW is used. Setting ψdV (u) equal to ψ and









that can be solved numerically in respect of R(D), to yield as a result formula:





which again is directly decomposable.7.2. RUIN PROBABILITY CRITERION 58
When the analytic solution is needed, we can make some further simpliﬁcations. Namely, the equation





























Provided the error of omission of higher order terms is small, we obtain the approximation:
R(D) ≈
−logψ
u + ρ(logψ + 1)
.
The error of the above solution is small, provided u is several times greater than the product
ρ|logψ + 1|. Under this condition we obtain the explicit (approximated) formula:






u + ρ(logψ + 1)

,
where the star symbolizes the simpliﬁcation made. Applying now the method of linear approximation of
marginal cost cdV ∗ (W + X) − cdV ∗ (W) (see Otto [33] for details) yields the result:
cdV ∗(X) = µX +
−logψ {u + 2ρ(logψ + 1)}




6{u + ρ(logψ + 1)}
2µ3,X.
The reader can verify that the formula cdV ∗(·) is additive for independent risks, and so it can serve
for marginal as well as for basic valuation.
7.2.7. Subexponential approximation. This method applies to the classical model (Poisson loss
arrivals) with thick-tailed severity distribution. More precisely, when the severity cdf FY possesses the
ﬁnite expectation µY , then the integrated tail distribution cdf FL1 (interpreted as the cdf of the variable
L1, being the “ladder height” of the claim surplus process) is deﬁned as follows:





{1 − FY (y)}dy.
Assuming now that the latter distribution is subexponential (see Section 5.2), we could obtain (applying









The extended study of consequences of thick-tailed severity distributions can be found in Embrechts et
al. [16].
All approximation methods presented in this section are more or less standard, and more detailed
information on them can be found in any actuarial textbook, as for example in Bowers et al. [5]. More
advanced analysis can be found in a book by Asmussen [1] and numerical comparison of this and other
approximations are given in ˇ Ciˇ zek, H¨ ardle and R.Weron, Chapter 15 by Burnecki, Mi´ sta and A.Weron.7.3. RUIN PROBABILITY CRITERION AND THE INSURANCE 59
7.3. Ruin probability criterion and the insurance
In this section operational reserves calculation is considered under predetermined ruin probability,
with cession of some part of risk to insurance company included. At ﬁrst an example involving the so
called insurance with self retention limit is presented.
Example 1 We assume, that the aggregate loss W has a compound Poisson distribution with ex-
pected number of claims λW = 1000, and with severity distribution being truncated-Pareto distribution











when y < M0
1 when y > M0
and parameters (α,ν,M0) = (2.5, 1.5, 500).
Variable W is subdivided into retained part WM and ceded part WM, that given the subdivision
parameter M ∈ (0,M0] have a form:
WM = Y M,1 + ... + Y M,N,
WM = Y M,1 + ... + Y M,N.
We assume also that the excess of each loss over the limit M ∈ (0,M0] is ceded to the insurer using













The problem lies in choosing such a value of the retention limit M and critical capital u, which
minimize the total own operational reserves and premium paid to insurer, under predetermined values
of parameters (ψ,θ0,θ1). The problem could be solved with application of the De Vylder and Beekman–
Bowers approximation methods, however allowing for insurance leads to numerical solutions.
Solution.
Now, the discrete-time version of the risk process is assumed:
Rn = u +
n







where all events are assumed to be observed once a year, and notations are obviously adapted.
The problem takes a form of minimization of the capital charge c under restrictions, which in the
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and in the version based on the Beekman–Bowers approximation method take a form:
c − c(I)  
WM

= (1 + θ)E(WM),
ψ = (1 + θ)
−1 (1 − Gα,β (u)),
































The ﬁrst step to solve it is to express moments of ﬁrst three orders of variables Y M and Y M as
functions of parameters (α,ν,M0) and the real variable M. Expected value of the truncated-Pareto
























































where the symbol mK,A means for A > 0 just the moment of order K of the truncated-Pareto variable




















when A = 1
The above formulas could serve to calculate raw moments as well of the variable Y M as the variable
Y , provided we replace M by M0. Having calculated moments for both variables Y M and Y already, we
make use of the relation:




















M as equal one
with probability one. Mixed moments appearing on the RHS of formula (7.4) can be calculated easily as
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Table 7.1. Minimization of operational reserves c with respect to choice of capital u
and retention limit M. Basic characteristics of the variable W: µW = 999.8, σW = 74.2,















BB 184.2 416.6 4.17%
dV 185.2 416.3 4.16%
V.2: ψ = 2.5%
BB 150.1 463.3 4.65%
dV 156.3 461.7 4.63%
V.3: θ0 = 50%
BB 126.1 406.2 4.13%
dV 127.1 406.0 4.13%
V.4: θ1 = 0.25%
BB 139.7 409.0 4.13%
dV 140.5 408.8 4.13%
V.5: (no insurance)
BB 500.0 442.9 4.25%
dV 500.0 442.7 4.25%
The second step is to express cumulants of both variables WM and WM as a product of the param-
eter λW and respective raw moments of variables Y M and Y M. All these characteristics are functions of
parameters (α,ν,λW) and the decision variable M.
Interpretation of solutions obtained in Example 1
Results of numerical optimization are reported in Table 7.1. In the basic variant of the problem,
parameters has been set on the level (ψ,θ0,θ1) = ( 5%, 100%, 0.5%). Variants 2, 3 and 4 diﬀer from the
basic variant by the value of one of parameters (ψ,θ0,θ1). Results could be summarized as follows:
(i) Insurance results in operational reserve reduction (compare variant 5 with variant 1), the need
for high critical capital level is also reduced.
(ii) Comparison of variants 2 and 1 shows that increasing safety (reduction of parameter ψ from
5% to 2.5%) results in signiﬁcant growth of capital charge needed. This eﬀect is caused as
well by increase of critical level of capital, as by increase of costs of insurance, because of
reduced retention limit. It is also worthwhile to notice that predetermining ψ = 2.5% results
in signiﬁcant diversiﬁcation of results obtained by two methods of approximation. In the case
when ψ = 5% the diﬀerence is neglectible.
(iii) Results obtained invariants 3 and 4 show that the optimal level of insurance is quite sensitive
to changes of parameters reﬂecting costs of insurance policy.
In a general case, i.e. other then truncated-Pareto severity distribution, the only diﬀerence in solving
the problem, is the calculation of the moments of this distribution as well as of the truncated distribution.7.4. FINAL REMARKS 62
7.4. Final remarks
It should be noted that all presented models, including risk participation of insurers, lead only to
a modiﬁcation of the distribution of the increment of the risk process. Still the mutual independence
of subsequent increments and their identical distribution is preserved. There are also models where
decisions concerning capital charge and insurance depend on current size of the company’s capital. In
general, models of this type need the stochastic control technique to be applied. Nevertheless, models
presented in this chapter preserve simplicity, and allow just to have insight on long-run consequences of
some decision rules, provided they remain unchanged for a long time. This insight is worthwhile despite
the fact that in reality decisions are undertaken on the basis of the current situation, and no ﬁxed strategy
remains unchanged under changing conditions of the environment. On the other hand, it is always a good
idea to have some reference point, when consequences of decisions motivated by current circumstances
have to be evaluated.Bibliography
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